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INTRODUCTION
Pollution is a heated topic nowadays. With the fast 
development of industry and the increasing demand for a better 
environment, pollution has been realized over past 30 years 
as an imminent problem for human beings. With one ocean 
shared by all, particular attention is focused on marine 
pollution in order to keep the ocean clear. Marine pollution 
mainly come from the following areas:
1. Land-based sources
2. Atmosphere
3. Shipping activities
4. Offshore oil industry
5. Radioactivity
6. Military dumping etc.
Shipborne pollution can be further classified into operational 
and accidental pollution. It is mainly the latter one that 
this project aims at. However, this does not mean that 
shipping generates the most pollutants at sea, nor does 
accidental pollution constitute the largest part of pollution 
from ships. In fact, shipborne pollution represents only 
12'/.^ of the manmade pollution and accidental spills are only 
one fouth of that®.
Yet the sudden breakout of the accidental spill is normally 
immediately disastrous upon the coastal states. The Torrey 
Canyon incident in 1968 made people almost totally unprepared
1 . A Lira r*«*por- -fe 1 md c= H 1 mc=>LAr~c; «• o*f m4Rnm«iel«r
oc pol 1 1 on ^ r- om 1 jftnPP«hmavci d 1 iv<=r->jRr*o«v mnd r*uu-io*F*f v
<73X> p mmr'1 i:; 1 m«r t;r* «nn opon t: KXZSViy p cf^mplriQ<10X> mnd pr*od4acrt: 1 on • L.Xoy’c^'’** 20 «
Soo AlflftO X m
2 Z n^or^^Anlco Annctwail P^opor-tz , 1 •9^0*^ » p 12.
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and the Amoco Cadiz in 1978 hit modern society another stroke. 
Even last year, the Exxon Valdez spilled 257,000 barrels o-f 
crude oil in Alaska and caused great disturbance so that it is 
still talked about nowadays. The impact o-f oil spills is 
catastrophic to the world. How to tackle the complicated 
issue o-f liability and how to get compensation at an 
international level remains the theme of this work.
2
Byarocarboii Introduced into 8ea
OffabAXM <1.0»>
LnniS i;4*.DK>
r
Figure 1 Sources o-f Manmade Ocean Pollution 
Source: Drafted from Lloyd’s List, March 20, 1989.
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1 CHAPTER ONE IMPACT OF OIL POLLUTION DISASTER
1.1 DISASTERS 8c DAMAGES
1.1.1 DISASTERS
Over the last 30 years there was a great increasing demand -for 
oil. Due to the importance of the oil producing locations and 
oil consuming locations, 60V.^ of the oil production has to be 
transported by sea. Not only crude oil is carried but because 
the refining of oil is at the destination, so the refined oil 
also has to be carried again to its customer.
This greatly provided cargoes for tanker business, from 299 
million tons in 1950 to 1,440 million tons in 1970=. Due to 
the scale of economics, tankers tended to be larger and 
larger, from VLCC 200,000DWT in 1967, ULCC 30O,000DWT in 1972 
to 500,000DWT in the late 70s until the tanker disasters such 
as the "Torrey Canyon" and the "Amoco Cadiz"etc.
As a consequence, tanker accidents rose. The first major one 
being the Torrey Canyon which grounded on Seven stones off the 
coast of England, and spilled 100,000 tons of crude oil. Some 
of the largest tanker spills since 1974 can be seen from Tab. 
1. The latest one causing world attention is the tanker "ExKon 
Valdez" On 24, March 1989, It grounded in Prince Williams 
Sound, Alaska, and spilled 11 million gallons. *
* Soni, Ramanlal, "Control of Maritime Pollution in 
International Law" . Cape Town: Juta Co. Ltd., 1985. P5.
® See Section 5, Lecture given by Professor P. Alderton 
at WMU.
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Figures 2 and 3 show the number of significant spills (those 
spilled more than 100 tons) was high, averaged 29 each year.
Table 1 The Largest Tanker Oil Spills 
1974.01 - 1989.03
Date Ship Spill (bl) Location
Jul 79 Atlantic Empress 2,044,000 off Trinidad
Mar 78 Amoco Cadiz 1,628,000 Brittany, France
Nov 88 Odyssey 1,000,000 Newfoundland
Feb 77 Hawaiian Patriot 742,500 Hawaiian Islands
Nov 79 Independenta 696,350 Bosporus, Turkey
May 76 Urquiola 670,000 Corunna, Spain
Feb 80 Irenes Serenade 600,000 Navarino Bay, Greece
Dec 89 Khark V 560,000 120m NW of Casablanca
Dec 85 Nova 500,000 off Kharg Islands
May 75 Epic Colocotronis 427,500 60m NW of Puerto Rico
Nov 74 Yuyo Maru No 10 375,000 Tokyo Bay
Jan 83 Assimi 370,000 58m off Muscat, Oman
Jan 75 British Ambassador 337,500 180m W of Iwojima
Aug 74 Metula 330,000 S Chile
Nov 79 Burmah Agate 300,000 off Galveston, US
Dec 78 Tadotsu 300,000
Jan 75 Jakob Maersk 300,000 Leixoes, Portugal
Dec 80 Juan Antonio
Laval 1ej a 280,000 A1geria
Mar 89 ExKon Valdez 257,000 A1aska
Jan 75 Corinthos 266,000 Delaware River, US
Source: Lloyd's List, 1990.03.24.
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Figure 3 Number of Significant Spills
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Source: Pro-f. B. K. Pu. Analysis of- Significant oil spill
Incidents from Ships, 1976-1985. Oil Spill Conference 1987 
USA. pp 43 - 45.
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1.1.2 Damage
Damage caused by these spills is enormous. These spills may 
cause death to the marine organisms, sea birds, and -fishes. 
They spoil the beaches, cause -fires, indirectly decrease the 
income of fishermen, hoteliers, restaurants...
Amounts for claims are huge. Let’s look at some of the major 
disasters:
--- The Atlantic Empress spilled 2 million barrels of crude
oil in July 1979 off Trinidad and the payout for this case 
reached US$54 million.
--- The VLCC Amoco Cadiz in 1978 destroyed the Brittany coast
of France. The French government mobilized lots of manpower as 
well as equipment. Booms, skimmers, absorbants and dispersants 
were deployed. The cleanup costs amounted to US$100-li0 
millions, 857. for sea cleaning and 157 for shore cleaning. And 
aquaculture suffered .US$3 millions. Tourism lost US$28M.‘ In 
1988, Amoco was/ ordered to pay the French Claimants 
US$85.2M.=
--- The latest major accident is the
year old disaster brought the possible 
is reported that Exxon has paid out 
purely for the cleanup cost=. Yet
Amoco Cadiz. This one 
claims to a climax. It 
2 billion US dollars 
this is not the end.
* A Study on the Establishment of Marine Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund in China. Beijing: Institute of Water 
Transportation Research, 1988. p4.
= "Major Oil Spills that would fill 11 VLCC", Lloyd's 
List 24-3-90.
® ibid.
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According to 
been brought 
out US$188M 
decision is 
be envisaged
Jim Mulrenam^, more than 170 civil actions has 
against Exxon up to March 1990. Exxon has paid 
to the damaged claimants. Although the -final 
not expected -for 10 years time, this accident can 
to be the most expensive one.
The above-mentioned cases are all involved with very large 
amounts o-f spilled oil. Yet even the smaller scale could also 
lead to a rather high -figure -for claims. The 18,048 grt tanker 
Tanio on March 1980 spilled 13,500 tons <82,000) o-ft Brittany, 
France, only k,'/. of the 240,000 ton Amoco Cadis. Its accepted 
claim reached US$48M, not much signi-ficance compared with the 
US$85.2M Amoco Cadiz case.=
The American Trader is another example to show the sometimes 
irrelevance between spill quantity and claims. This 80,735 
tones dwt tanker gave rise to 9,400 barrels o-f oi 1 , a relative 
small amount, being spilled on Feb. 7, 1990 at Huntington 
Beach in Alaska. A US$1 billion damage suit has already been 
instituted.® Though this amount is slightly possible to be 
achieved, final claims may well exceed US$ 100 M.
Shipping is of an international nature. When an oil spill 
occurs, people from many different countries might be 
concerned. This makes the pollution problem extremely 
complicated. Like the Amoco Cadiz case, the ship was flying a 
Liberian flag; its Amoco Transport Company was registered in 
Liberia. The ship was built by Astilleros Espanoles, S.A., a 
Spanish builder and classed with the American Bureau of
‘ ibid.
® See Annual Report 1988 of lOPC Fund, p26.
® "Tanker Spill Clean-up Continues", Lloyd’s List, Feb. 
13, 1990.
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to state E! Co., and 
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An evean worse case is whe?n two tanker ;ollide into each other
and the oil from both ships affects seyeral coaxsta.l itat.es,
Thercafore, numeroxas parties V'jill be involyed in a single 
pollution incident®;
the Flegistered Owner5
the Actuaxl Owner in the? absence of registered owner; 
the Parent Company of the owner,; 
the Operator5 
the Man-ager,;
All kinds of Chaxrtere^rs axnd sub-charterers 
the P I Club,;
Aibecassi’ 
I... o n d o n : S t e v e n s
Da.yid U). et al . , Oil 
Sons, 19S5. pp 4-5.
P o11ution from Ship s.
Based on 1. ec t.ur e not e on Slx i p own er 
. J . M1 y n -a r c z y k . r1 a r c h 1990, W M Li.
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!.... i a b i 1 i t y , give n
by Prof
the Cargo Owner <s); 
the Cargo Consignee(s);
The Officers & Crew of the ship; 
the Shipbuilder ?< Designer; 
the Ship Repairer; 
the Classification Society;
the Governments of coastal states being affected; 
the Companies and Individuals being affected; 
the Flag State Authorities; 
the Salvor(s);
Hundreds of Hull S< Machinery and cargo underwriters etc.
1.2 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
In the wake of a series of oil pollution disasters, states 
began to study the cause of incidents and tried hard to 
prevent and combat oil spills. In so doing, various 
regulations were established and applied to the shipping 
industry.
r
However, due to the complex nature of oil trading and
transportation, the parties involved being so international1y 
mixed, and the fact that there is only one ocean which is
shared by all, regulations at an international level are much
more important, as far as it seems to me. This is the only way 
to unify the different practices existing to make the problem 
less complicated. Since 50s and especially from the Torrey 
Canyon in 1967, action has been taken by the international 
community to combat oil pollution. Constructive conventions 
and agreements with detailed guidelines and recommendations 
have come out. For the purpose of this project , they are
classified as conventions of preventive measures and
conventions regarding civil liability and compensation.
lO
1.2.1 Conventions of Preventive nature
Although it could be dated back to June 8-16, 1926, when the 
■first international conference on marine oil pollution was 
held in Washington and there was another international 
conference of the same kind in Beneva, 1935, convened by the 
League of Nations, it was not until 1954 that the world’s 
first international treaty on oil pollution - the 1954 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of 
the Sea by Oil (OILPOL 54) - was adopted at an international 
conference in London. Since then, and particularly after the 
Torrey Canyon and Amoco Cadiz etc, new and more stringent 
rules were established to supersede the 1954 OILPOL. The most 
important one being the 1973 International Convention for 
Prevention of Pollution from ships, as modified by the 
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (commonly known as Marpol 
73/78). This convention came into force on October 2, 1986. It 
now has 57 contracting parties, covering 85.257. of world 
tonnage.*
Marpol 73/78 Annex I is the core of this convention. It 
provides the detailed regulations for the prevention of 
Pollution by oil. .Some of the important requirements for 
operational procedures are briefed hereunder.
1.2.1.1 Load-On-Top (LOT) System
This is a tank cleaning procedure. Before the LOT was 
introduced, tank cleaning water and dirty ballast water was 
conventionally discharged directly into the sea. This 
constituted a major source of ship-generated oil pollution. 
LOT first appeared in the 1969 Amendments to OILPOL 54 and was *•
*• MEPC 29/2, I MO. 1990-02-08.
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used by 85% o-f the tanker -fleet -for existing tankers on long 
haul voyages in the 70s.^
With the LOT method, tank cleaning water and dirty ballast 
water are separated into clean water and oil residues (oil- 
water mixture). The clean water is pumped overboard on top of 
the oil residue. This greatly reduced the oil being discharged 
directly from tanker operations.
1.2.1.2 Crude-Oi1-Washing (COW) System
Required by Reg. 13(6) of Annex I, Marpol 73/78, COW is a more 
advanced system than LOT in dealing with ballasting and tank 
washing. Crude oil washing uses crude oil itself to wash off 
oil clinage and is much more effective than water washing. 
More than 90% of the oil clinage could be wiped out.=®
There is a safety requirement for the use of COW. That is the 
Inert Gas System (IBS), and it must be in accordance with 
Chi I-2 regulations of SOLAS.
/
1.2.1.3 Other Systems
Marpol lays down further requirements for new and some 
existing tankers on equipment and construction features. These 
are :
Segregated Ballast Tank (SET);
Protective Location of SET (PL);
^ Parker, H.D. S< Pitt, B.D., Pollution Control 
Instrumentati on for Oil and Effluents. London: Graham ?<
Trotman Ltd., 1987. p27.
- ibid, p 34.
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Dedicated Clean Ballast Tank <DCBT); and
Oil Record Book and lOPP <International Oil Pollution
Prevention) certificate.
There is also a requirement for shore reception facilities.
Although new regulations and technology have been steadily 
introduced to the international shipping community and reduced 
certain pollution incidents, it is realised that accidental 
and operational spill can not be eliminated. Since machines 
have to be operated by men, thus manmade errors or negligence 
can not be eliminated. In fact, it is found out that 90V. of 
the accidents were due to human factors through the process of 
ship designing, shipbuilding, operating, manning and operating
.....  , like the faulty designing of the Amoco Cadis or the
overdrinking of Captain Hasalwood of Exxon Valdes. Language 
barriers may be another contributing factor, especially on 
those ships manned by different nationalities. This shows how 
vulnerable human beings are, and this important human fatigue 
factor has been under discussion at IMO’s STCW subcommittee 
for several years.
Oil pollution, so long as oil remains the major energy and 
has to be shipped by sea, will inevitably occur (just as I was 
writing this in June, 3 tankers spilled oil in US and Swedish 
waters), and one of the after spill problems - liability and 
compensation - has to be addressed.
1.2.2 Conventions regarding Liability and Compensation
Handbook on Marine Pollution. Arendal:^ Gold, Edgar, 
Bard, 1985. p. 132.
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After a spill, one important thing is clean-up, aiming at 
restoring the marine environment to its prespill condition. 
This is undoubtedly of crucial importance and very effective 
to reduce the extent of damage. In the clean-up process, 
tremendous financial and labor resources are mobilised to 
combat the spill. As a consequence, questions like " who is 
liable for the spill", "who should and how to pay for the 
damage and costs" will always occur. This gives rise to the 
liability and compensation issue, which is of equal importance 
to the technical clean-up.
This is a thorny and extremely complex problem, which has to 
be regulated at international level:
1) . too many parties involved; shipowner, charterer(s),
manager, P S< I club<s), coastal state, claimants..... ;
2) . too many states involved, like in the Tanio case, 
more than 5;
3) . too expensive; Exxon has spent more than $2 billion 
by March 1990. This sum of money is a heavy burden upon 
the spiller. For a shipping line whose parent company is 
a big consortium, like the Exxon Co., it may take active 
part in combating the spill and spend tremendous money 
and energy on it. But what if the spill is caused by a 
one-tanker company? The shipowner will simply not be 
financially able to provide great resources. Thus it will 
be of disadvantage to the whole clean-up process and more 
damage might be caused by delay;
4) . Too long litigations; Long legal proceedings will 
always come in the wake of a disaster. It takes years for 
the court to make a final decision. The Amoco Cadiz
14
years ago,spilled oil some 12 years ago, yet the case is still 
hanging in the States. For the Exxon Valdez, it is 
without difficulty to expect that it will go well into 
the next century. At the same time, legal expenses will 
amount to a significant sum; and
5). Numerous claimants. Even a small scale spill will 
have lots of claimants. Coastal authorities, governmental 
departments, fisheries, hoteliers, restaurants, by 
individual or corporate body. Large spills like the Exxon 
Valdez has made Exxon facing "170 individual civil 
actions from a range of other companies, groups and 
individuals" until March 1990, and more than "7,000 
individual plaintiffs are preparing" to take action 
against it, despite it has paid out $188 million to 
11,000 individuals and groups.*-
There are still more problems, but even with the above listed, 
one can imagine the complexity. National law has long 
dominated and regulated the liability issue, but it has been 
found unsatisfactory by both the suffering parties and the 
spillers. Such an international issue has to be done by the 
international community. Chapter two deals exclusively with 
such international regimes.
*■ "Mass of Litigation that Faces Exxon for Years to 
Come", Mulrenan, Jim, Lloyd's List March 24, 1990.
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2 CHAPTER TWO GLOBAL REGIMES
2.1 THE ENTIRE REGIME
Civil liability of oil pollution has long been subject to
municipal legislation until the late 60s when the Torrey
Canyon brought disastrous and enormous problems to the modern 
society and gave rise to the first exclusive international 
convention regime of CLC. In the following years, a series of 
pollution disasters accelerated the process. The present 
integrated regime is made up of the following;
St<»XL1TOI=5V CoiMVEMyiOlsIS
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damages, 1969 (CLC) and its 1976 Protocol;
Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages, 1969;
International^ Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 1971 (FUND) and its 1976 Protocol;
Protocol of 1984 to Amend the Internetional Convention on 
the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (FUND) and 
its 1976 Protocol.
Voi_tJMT«F»V AcSI^tEEMCMXSS
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Governing Liability for 
Oil Pollution, 1969 (TOVALOP) and its amendments;
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the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker 
Liability -for Oil Pollution, 1971 (CRISTAL) and its 
amendments.
The statutory conventions were adopted at diplomatic 
conferences convened by IMQ. They are ratified by sovereign 
state and are binding in nature for state parties.
The agreements were drafted by industrial companies. 
Individual shipping and oil companies can join the agreements 
and become a member on a voluntary basis. Member have 
contractual obligation under these agreements.
Theoretical 1y there also exist some conventions which deal 
with general civil liabilities including oil pollution civil 
liability still in force;
International Convention International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation 
of the Liability of Owners of Sea-going vessels 1924 
(Liability 1924);
International Convention Relating to the Limitation of 
the Liability of Owners of Sea-going ships 1957 
(Liability 1957);
The Convention of Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims,1976 (LLMC).
These instruments form an integral part of the global regime 
of Liability for oil pollution. They provide the basis for 
Limitation of Civil Liability for general Maritime Claims, 
therefor there are restrictions for specific oil pollution 
claims.
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As it provided in Article 3 paragraph(b) of LLMC 76:
" The rules of this convention shall not apply to:
(a) .....
<b) Claims -for oil pollution damage within the meaning o-f the 
CLC, dated Nov.29,1969 or o-f any amendment or protocol 
thereto which is in -force;
Wherever the exclusive CLC is the governing law in a case, the 
general LLMC will no longer be applicable, or to construe it 
another way, these general liability conventions apply to 
member states of those conventions which are not parties to 
CLC or apply to member states of both CLC and these 
conventions, but liability for oil pollution damage is not 
covered by CLC 69 and Fund 71.
However, these conventions merely impose limitation on state 
parties. They do not create the basis for liability, whether a 
party is liable or not and to what degree oil pollution damage 
is left to national law. They are inadequate and because of 
the low limitatiorf under these conventions they are most 
unpopular in the present oil pollution liability regime. CLC 
and Fund, providing the basis for strict liability and 
compensation for damage, and relatively higher limitation 
amounts are much more widely applied.
Annex II shows 66 countries representing 827. of world tonnage 
have ratified CLC 69, and 43 ratified Fund 71, a 57.9% of 
total tonnage. Liability 1924 and 1957 Brussel conventions are 
not universally accepted and no more new countries are likely 
to ratify these 2 with the entry into force of LLMC 1976, 
which was designed to replace the previous conventions. In 
fact, as per February 1990, (?) 43% of world tonnage has been
18
subject to this new convention.
CLC and FUND are more universally accepted so -far as oil 
pollution liability concerns. It is also important to notice 
that all the 15 member states to LLMC 76 are at the same time 
contracting parties to CLC 69. Accordingly the principle that 
LLMC will be applicable -for those LLMC but not CLC parties 
remains only theoretically correct. What is left for LLMC and 
other general limitation conventions are those cases not 
covered by CLC but by these conventions. It is noted that this 
includes the cases when CLC doesn’t apply even for a 
contracting party. For a example, where cleanup expenses have 
been incurred when a cargo vessel spilled bunker oil through 
negligence. CLC is not applicable for a cargo vessel. Such a 
shipowner, however, may be found liable under national law, 
then he may be able to limit his liability by invoking the 
general liability rules if the flag state is a contracting 
party to it. However, such cases are rare, so far as oil 
pollution liability concerns. Therefore, this project is 
confined to the specific pollution liability conventions.
■ /•
2.2 CLC 69
This convention is a fallout of Torrey Canyon disaster . It 
was adopted at the International Legal Conference on Marine? 
Pollution damage in Brussels on 29 Nov. 1969. Its main 
objective is to establish uniform intentional rules for oil 
pollution liability and to provide adequate compensation for 
damage.
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Liability of shipowner has long been based on fault. The 
claimant will have to prove that the shipowner is negligent in 
order to hold him liable. This is quite fair for general 
maritime claims, taking account of the maritime risks in sea 
transportation, but this notion is far from satisfactory for 
oil pollution liability. CLC, coming in timely fashion in 1969 
and enteringinto force in 1975, created the principle of 
strict liability and compulsory insurance, a revolutionary 
approach in the oil pollution field.
2.2.1 Liability under CLC
2.2.1.1 Strict Liability 
Art III (1) provides that;
"... the owner of a ship at the time of an incident, or 
where the incident consists of a series of occurrences at 
the time of the first such occurrence, shall be liable 
for any pollution damage caused by oil which gas escaped 
or been discharged from the ship as a result of the 
incident."
This principle is illustrated in the case of Esso Petroleum 
Co. Ltd. V. Southport Corporation^, where an oil tanker was 
stranded in a river estuary and, to prevent further damage, 
discharged a quantity of oil which polluted the foreshore 
belonging to Southport Corporation. As the oil pollution 
damage then was based on fault in the UK, it was decided by 
the Appeal Court in 1956 that since the claimant had not been 
able to prove the negligence of the shipowner , the shipowner 
was not liable for the damage.
‘ (1956) A.C. 218.
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It would be held di-fferently today under CLC 69. The shipowner 
is strictly liable without proo-f o-f -fault. This is a big 
advantage -for claimants. Bene-fits are summarised as -follows:’-
1. This rightly embodies the "principle o-f polluter 
pays", because the polluter bene-fits -from the shipping 
activity and it is reasonable -for him to bear the 
pollution risk through compulsory insurance. As to the 
-financial burden on polluter, Prof. Wetterstein was of 
the opinion that the insurance cost should be, and in 
fact is, added into the operating cost and this will be 
passed on to consumers;
2. In so doing the polluting parties are pressed to 
exercise due diligence;
3. This system "encompasses a broader range" of 
compensatable damage;
4. The damaged parties are released of "the burden of 
proof";
5. This system ensures "expeditious compensation" and 
saves lots of extremely high legal expenses;
6. A unified System based on strict liability simplifies 
the problem and is effective in international disasters.
Prof. Wetterstein also cited a most comprehensive system of 
strict liability as "a modern, practicable and functional 
system of compensation".
2.2.1.2 Scope of Application
The coverage of the convention is narrowed by the definitions *
* Wetterstein, P, Damage from Internationa]_Ei sasteH-S--Lq
the Light of Tort and Insurance__Law. Turku; Abo Akademi
University, Finland, 1989. pp 54-56.
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and wording in the convention as a compromise in the 69 
Conference.
"Ship" is defined in Art. I (1> as " any-seagoing vessel and 
any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying 
oil in bulk as cargo". This covers only laden tankers or 
combination vessels. Lake, river and other cargo vessels are 
not included, even for tankers carrying no oil cargo on board. 
So, the damage caused by bunker oil from Olympia Bravery, off 
the French coast in’ 1976 was not covered by CLC as she was on 
a ballast voyage.*
"Oil" is defined as "persistent oil".= This consists of 
crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubri’cating oil and 
whale oil but excludes a large quantity of refined oil and 
vegetable oil. Dirty ballast and oil residues are also 
excepted. This inclusion of whale oil is peculiar and 
therefore it is removed by the 1984 Protocol .=*
Oil must have "escaped or been discharged from the ship". This 
includes both accidental spills and operational discharge, but 
the coming out of oil must be real and it does not cover "pure 
threat" situations. This was tested by the Tarpenbeck case.
The scope of the convention is further restricted only to such 
"damage caused on the territory including the territorial sea 
of a contracting state", irrespective of whether the 
registered state is a contracting party or not. This clause
1 1 m 9 cd 9 W •> 9 • Oil 1 laIi 1 on r* om 1 •
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joined the CLCbenefits the suffering country which has 
convention, so, in order to avail itself of the advantage, a 
state has to participate in the convention.
2.2.1.3 Channelling of Liability
All liability is channelled to the owner. His servants and 
agents are protected from claims and in the 1984 Protocol even 
the salvors and bareboat charterers are protected. Once the 
owner is sued under this convention, he shall not be claimed 
against under another legal basis, say common law. This is 
reasonable and beneficial for the claimants since in the 
modern shipping world, ships may be chartered several times 
thus the claimants have great difficulty in choosing the 
wrongdoer, and what is more annoying is that the one being 
claimed against might be one ship or no ship company and has 
gone bankrupt.
The owner of the ship on the other hand, knows clearly his 
ship’s movements and conditions and is backed by P I
insurance against..third party liability thus financially 
capable. There might also be pressure on the shipowner to 
exercise his due diligence to prevent from pollution.
2.2.2 Right to Limit and Conduct Barring the Limit
2.2.2.1 Right to Limit
This convention imposes strict liability on shipowners, but it 
is not absolute liability. They are entitled to limit to 2,000 
francs each ton and not exceed 210 million francs in any case. 
This could be regarded as the result of compromise between 
claimants and shipping industry, but the fact that the
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pollution insurance cover is limited^ also led to.such coming 
out. It would be pointless to hold a -financially incapable 
person unlimitedly liable.
Furthermore, "the society should be prepared to bear a certain 
degree of damage and discomfort" and this is the price we have 
to pay for our "high standard of living and technical 
progress".^® The limit of tolerance principle is used here for 
shipping industry which is nowadays very vulnerable. Without 
the sharing of the burden by society, the oil transport 
industry would collapse and this will do more harm than good 
for the society.
ExeMF>X X ON
There are four cases where the shipowner is fully or partially 
exempted from liability if he proves that the damage results 
from;
1. an act of war or a natural phenomenon of an 
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character;
2. wholly by third party;
3. wholly by'the negligence of government agencies; and
4. he may wholly or partially be released from liability 
if the claimant constitutes contributory negligence. In 
the Amoco -Cadis case,=® the shipowner counter claimed 
against the French government for their negligence in 
failing to "prevent or contain the spill". Although it 
was dismissed-as an entire exemption, Judge McGarr ruled
1 *TH«» m«(>< 1 mcjim 1 nvcAr-mfes X X 1 1 X 1 t:: v (Jem XAM In
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that "Amoco cannot be liable -for damage resulting from 
any inept clean up e-fforts which in tact e',-;acerbated the 
harm".
Exxon also counter claimed Alaskan authority tor improper use 
ot chemical dispersants.
A successtul example using the provision is the Tsesis, a 
Russian ship, which went aground in Swedish water in 1977 and 
caused oil pollution. The shipowner claimed to be exonerated 
under Art IV (2) (c) and the supreme court ot Swedish also
held him exempted because the Swedish government had tailed 
properly to maintain maritime charts which, atter heavy 
debate, were "other navigational aids."=
2.2.3 Conduct Barring the Right to Limit
The shipowner shall not be entitled to limit his liability it 
the incident resulted trom his actual tault or privity.
2.2.4 Units of Account
The shipowner is limited to 2,000 trancs tor each ton ot the 
ship's tonnage (limitation ton as is otten called) with a 
ceiling ot 210 million trancs maximum.
In order to avail himselt ot the limitation, the shipowner 
must constitute a tund, which is his limitation amount, with 
the court. Although this article creates no legal complexity, 
there might be ditticulty in practice as to the conversion 
trom trancs to national currency. Theretore, aiming at 
unitormity and also using a relatively stable currency, the
1 1_1 C3v<=f ' w l_ 1 mt . , 1 vro .
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1976 Protocol (so called SDR Protocol since it amended nothing 
but the unit of currency.) replaced the francs with 133 
Special Drawing Rights per limitation ton and a ceiling of 14 
million
SDR, from April 8, 1981. For parties only to CLC 69 or non-IMF 
members whose national law prohibits the use of SDR, francs 
shall apply.
2.2.5 Present Status of CLC 69
As per January 1, 1989, there are 66 contracting states (see 
Annex I), covering 827. of total world deadweight tonnage.
2.3 FUND 71
2.3.1Introduction
This convention is supplementary to the CLC 69. CLC 69 places 
the burden on the shipowning industry, while FUND 71 was based 
on the burden-sharing principle for the mutual benefit of both 
shipping and oil ^.ndustries and also due to public pressure. 
It created a compensation fund contributed by the oil cargo 
sector towards pollution damage.
FUND 71 was adopted on December 18, 1971 at a diplomatic 
conference in Brussels. It came into force on Oct. 16, 1978. 
Its two main purposes are; to fully and adequately compensate 
the victims of oil pollution damage; and to reduce the 
shipowner of the additional financial burden imposed by the 
CLC convention. The basic principle is that, where liability 
under the CLC ends, the FUND 71’s liability begins. Both the 
victims of damage and the owner of the ship may be claimants 
against the lOPC Fund (International Oil Pollution Fund). lOPC 
Fund here functions as an insurance company. It receives
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contributions from oil companies and compensate victims and 
shipowner out of this Fund.
FUND 71 contains the following 48 Articles:
General Provisions (Art 1-3);
Compensation and Indemnification (Art 4-9);
Contributions (Art 10-15);
Organization and Administration (Art 16);
Assembly (Art 17-20);
Executive Committee (Art 21-27);
Secretariat (Art 28-30);
Finances (Art 31);
Voting (Art 32-34);
Transitional Provisions (Art 35-36); and 
Final clauses (Art 37-48).
2.3.2 Scope of Application
"Ship", "person", "owner", "pollution damage" and "preventive 
measures" etc remains identical with the CLC 69 convention. 
The only difference^ is the exclusion of whale oil.. Only crude 
oil and fuel oil is covered by FUND 71.
2.3.3 Compensation for Pollution Damage
2.3.3.1 Compensation
Under Art 4(1), the lOPC Fund shall pay compensation to the 
victims if;
a. no liability is available under CLC 69;
b. the shipowner is financially incapable; and
c. the damage exceeds the CLC 69 limit or limit under
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other international conventions.
Such compensation is available to claimants -from contracting 
parties to FUND, irrespective o-f what flag the ship is -flying.
Costs o-f preventive measures by the shipowner are also 
recoverable -from Fund, as an incentive to the owner to take 
active action against pollution.
It worthwhile to note also that the Fund is still liable i-f 
the damage is resulted from exceptional natural phenomenon, or 
wholly caused by a third party act or negligence of any 
government.
2.3.3.2 Exemption
There are exceptions for the lOPC Fund:
a. Damage resulting from war, hostilities, civil war or 
insurrection; or
b. Damage resulting from a state-owned ship;or
c. There is lack of evidence that the damage is caused by 
an incident involving a ship.
The Fund may also be exonerated wholly or partially if the 
damage is resulted wholly or partially from the negligence of 
the victim, but such exemption shall not extend to preventive 
measures. *-
2.3.3.3 Practices with Compensation Claims
In practice, almost all claims for pollution damage
compensation come under Art 4(1)(C), that is when the damage 
is greater than the CLC limit.=
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Out of the 34 incidents involving claims against lOPC Fund 
from October 1978 to Jan. 1989, with only one exception, 33 
cases have been solved out of court.‘ This illustrates the 
importance of the lOPCF attitude towards compensation.
2.3.3.4 Principles of IDPC Fund Regarding the Admissibility 
of Claims
In connection with the settlement of 
developed certain principles as to 
claims. Although they are not binding, 
to know them.
claims , the lOPCF has
the admissi b i 1 i t y of
it is of practical use
Dr. M. Jacobsson, the Director of lOPCF and Mr. Norbert Trots 
have elaborated these principies*in the Journal of Maritime 
Law and commerce.=
A. Personal. Injljrv and Dbsaxm
Since "pollution damage" includes the costs of preventive 
measures and furtfier loss or damage caused by preventive 
measures, the personal injury and death caused during 
preventive measure operations would be covered by the 
definition of "pollution damage".
B. Costs ror Ci_eanup* Orerations
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The lOPCF compensates costs incurred -for clean-up operations 
at sea and on the beach:
Sea clean-up costs may include: the deployment of
vessels, crew salaries, booms and dispersants;
Shore clean-up costs may be: personnel, equipment,
absorbants and other services and supplies.
C . Prevent I v/E HEASLjnES
It only covers costs of reasonable measures, which has to be 
considered from an objective point of view. This may include: 
Sealing of fractures of the damaged ship;
Deployment of booms to prevent oil reaching the shore; 
Using of dispersants etc.
However, "pure threat removal measures " are not covered.
D . Drivirqq; TD PwOf”EPeXV
lOPCF compensates the cost of:
Cleaning contaminated property such as boats, fishing 
gear, pid'rs, embankments, beaches and roads etc; 
repair of the damaged property in the cleaning process; 
replacement of unrecoverable contaminated property.
F . Cai^VASE Op**EP«AX I ONE
"Salvage operations" can be considered as preventive measures 
only if their primary purpose is to prevent or minimize
pollution damage. If operations have previously another
purpose such as salvaging the hull or cargo, the operations 
would not be considered as preventive measures.
F . CoNSEClUENT I AL_ LoES
Loss of income of the owners or users of contaminated or
damaged property such as a polluted fishing boat or gear are
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accepted
G. Pure Economic: Loqs
CLC 69 is not clear on this respect. But there has been a 
trend to include such loss as the consequential losses to a 
certain extent and lOPCF has agreed to "compensate economic 
loss suffered by persons who depend directly on earnings from 
coastal or sea-related activities, eg, loss of earnings 
suffered by fishermen and by hoteliers and restaurants at 
seaside" . *•
H. D«:,mrse to the Environment
Non-economic damage to the environment is not accepted by 
lOPCF. Compensation for the restoration of the marine 
environment is restricted only to reasonable measures 
undertaken or to be undertaken.
2.3.4 Indemnification for Shipowners
To relieve the burden of the shipowner, certain
indemnification is provided under Art 5, Fund 71 up to 210 
million francs.
However, the lOPCF is exonerated wholly or partially if:
a. the pollution damage is a result of the wilful 
misconduct of the owner, or
b. if the owner, as the result of actual fault or
privity, fails to comply with the convention
‘ nil Rnin CnnfRrpnrP 19R7, I IRA. p P.F=iA.
31
requirements under Art. 5 (3) <a) and such non-compliance
is the whole or partial cause o-f the incident.
Up to December 31, 1984, 10 claims tor indemnitication had
been settled by lOPCF, but no exoneration of lOPCF has been 
experienced.^
2.3.5 Units of Account
Although there is a 76 SDR Protocol aiming at replacing the 
current unit of account to Special Drawing Rights, this 
Protocol has not come into torce and most likely never will.=^ 
Therefore, the present unit of account is still francs.
2.3.5.1 Calculation for Compensation
The original ceiling in Art. 4 (4) (a) was 450 million francs.
This was changed to 675 million francs (US$ 18.5 M on 
90.01.01), based on a French proposal soon after the Amoco 
Cadis. It came into operation on April 20, 1979.
The amount payable under this Article is a subtraction from 
675 million the amount of compensation actually paid to 
victims under CLC 69. A formula might be useful to describe 
it;
FCA = TCA - CCA, when TCA < 675 M francs; or
FCA = 675 - CCA, when TCA >/= 675 M francs,
where; FCA: FUND Compensation Amount 
TCA: Total Compensation Amount 
CCA: CLC Compensation Amount
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The formula also shows that FCA can not be determined without 
knowing the total compensation payable. It is therefore 
advisable for the claimants to negotiate with the polluter and 
lOPCF on the total amount in order to get expeditious IDF’CF 
compensation.
2.3.5.2 Calculation for Indemnification
The lOPCF will indemnify part of the shipowner’s CLC liability 
that exceeds the lesser one of either 1,500 francs (100 SDR) 
per ton or 125 million francs (8.3 M SDR) up to the CLC 
ceiling, which is the lesser one of either 2,000 francs (133 
SDR) per ton or 210 million francs (14 M SDR).
Formula; FIA = SLA - ■£1,500 t T, 125 N / m 1 n ,
when SLA </= £2,000 t T, 210 or
FIA = f2,000 * T, 210 - £1,500 * T, •1 o*=: M*'-J. JLsJ 1 1.^ m 1 n f
when SLA > = £2,000 * T, 210
where: FIA; FUND Indemnification Amount
SLA; Shipowner’s CLC Liability Amount 
T; •'Ship’s Limitation Tonnage
The indemnification under FUND accounts for roughly one fourth 
of the shipowner’s CLC liability.^
2.3.6 Administration
Under the FUND organisation rule, there js an Assembly, an 
Executive Committee and a Secretariat.
The daily operation of the lOPCF is administered by the 
secretariat. It is a small organization with one Director, who
1 2,000 — l,BOO — esoo , whllls-l: SOO /' 2,000 X/'A.
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is the legal representative, one Legal Officer, one Finance / 
Personnel Officer, three Secretaries and one Messenger. The 
main function among the other things of the Secretariat is to 
handle the claims for compensation. Through its 12 years 
operation, it has gained considerable experience on claims and 
the Director’s attitude towards claims settlement is crucial 
in determination of the compensation amount.
lOPCF, has been active and effective in dealing with pollution 
compensation and is now advocating broader participation in 
the FUND 71 as well as FUND 84 regimes.
2.3.7 How to Claim
Any person who has suffered pollution damage in a Fund 
contracting state may claim for compensation against the 
lOPCF. Such a person includes a state or other authorities. 
The claim should be submitted to the lOPCF as soon as 
possible. The address is: lOPC Fund
4 Albert Embankment 
' London SEl 7SR
UK
Tel; 071-5822606
There is a time bar provision of 3 years from the date on 
which the damage occurs. In no case may an action be brought 
after 6 years from the date of the incident.
A claim should be presented in writing (including telefax or 
telex) in English or French preferably. Each item of claim 
must vet supported by explanatory notes or invoices or other 
materials.
It is also suggested that claimants should get in touch with
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the lOPCF Director after the incident.
To facilitate people with claims, IQPCF has produced a Claims 
Manual^ which listed all particulars a claim should contain 
and other practical information.
2.3.8 Status of Fund
As at January 31, 1990, there are 43 contracting parties for 
FUND 71, some 547. of world tonnage.
2-4 TOVALDP (Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement 
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution)
2.4.1 Introduction
The Torrey Canyon incident in 1967 has to 2 international 
conventions on liability and compensation issues. Although CLC 
and FUND were produced in 1969 and 1971 respectively, they 
had to wait for 6 or 7 years before they came into force. 
Fearing there might be another disaster before they became 
effective and under public pressure, the oil and tanker 
industries took constructive action in producing 2 voluntary 
agreements - TOVALOP CRISTAL.
TOVALDP was developed on January 7, 1969 and came into
operation on October 6, 1969, covering 507. of the world tanker 
fleet. This figure soon reached 9971 in 1972 and is still as 
high as 977. nowadays.® Since part of the - remaining 37. is 
laid- up tonnage, it can be said that almost every tanker in 
sight is covered by this important regime.
1 CZX MAmuiAl • L.oricdoni I OP**C F'cjincd t 1*T70.
zz -rovAL.oi“. i-onaoni XTar»r' L.^ci. p i.
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There were several amendments since 1969: in 1972, 1975, 1978, 
1982 and 1981. In 1986, it underwent a substantial change, 
resulting in the amended TOVALOP, or the Standing Agreement as 
it is called now, and a Supplement. Parties to TOVALOP are 
automatically subject to the Standing Agreement and the 
Supplement.
2.4.2 The Standing Agreement
2.4.2.1 Assumed Responsibility
Art. IV provides that the participating owner of a tanker 
voluntarily assumes responsibility in respect of pollution 
damage and the cost of threat removal measures taken as a 
result of the incident.
However, no responsibility shall be assumed if the incident 
resulted from a war act, an exceptional natural phenomenon, 
third party act or government negligence (the same exemption 
as CLC 69). the Standing Agreement will also cease to operate 
if the incident ^occurred in a place where the CLC is 
applicable.
2.4.2.2 Limits of Financial Responsibility
Clause VII limits a participating owner’s financial 
responsibility for one incident to a maximum of US$ 160 per 
limitation ton or US$ 16.8 M, whichever is less, (see figure 7
)
The right to limit i s absol Lite and could not be broken.
different from that i n CLC 69. TOVALOP was originally
intended to encourage tanker owners to take measures
themselves voluntarily to clean up spills regardless of the 
need for establishing the liability.
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The -financial responsibility is further limited by a 2-year 
time bar, from the date of the incident.
2.4.2.3 Comparison with CLC
Some of the major differences:
1. TOVALOP is voluntary, covering only those tankers owned 
by the parties to TDVALOP;
CLC is a statutory convention. It is binding and applies 
to all vessels within the scope of its provisions;
2. TOVALOP applies to the pure threat situation;
3. TOVALOP applies to ballast tankers;
4. the right to limit under TOVALOP is absolute;
5. TOVALOP includes the bareboat charterer as the owner;
6. pure speculative and remote loss or damage is excluded 
specifically dnder TOVALOP; and
7. disputes under TOVALOP must be settled by arbitration.
2.4.3 TOVALOP Supplement
The Supplement is designed to raise the limit substantially in 
order to mirror the development of international conventions, 
i.e. the 1984 Protocols to the CLC and FUND, such an agreement 
was reached between tanker owners and oil companies in 1986. 
Whilst TOVALOP still remains a single agreement and all 
parties to it are at the same time automatically bound by both 
the Standing agreement and the Supplement, it is important to 
note that the terms of the supplement apply only to Applicable
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Incidents.* In all other cases, only the Standing Agreement 
will -function.'
The Supplement dif-fers -from the SA in the following aspects:
2.4.3.1 Responsibility
As is described in 2.4.2.3, the SA will cease to be operative 
if an incident occurred in a CLC applicable state. This has 
been rectified by the Supplement, thus has made the Supplement 
applicable to an applicable incident in all countries, 
irrespective of whether the incident appears in a CLC or both 
CLC and FUND state. This Supplement led TOVALOP to a worldwide 
agreement.
2.4.3.2 Limit of Compensation
The participating owner is entitled to limit his 
responsibility in the case of a tanker:
t
0-5,000 grt, US$ 3 M; *
5,000-140,000 grt, US$ 3 M plus US$ 493 per ton for
each ton in excess; and
over 140,000 grt, US $70 M, which is a little bit 
lower than but comparable with CLC 84.
2.4.3.3 "Ton" Definition
"Ton" under the Supplement means a ton of a tanker's gross 
tonnage determined by the Tonnage Measurement Convention 1969,
* "Applicable Incident" means any occurrence which causes 
pollution damage by oil when the cargo in the tanker is 
"owned" by an Oil Company party to CRISTAL. See Clause 1 (1)
(A) of the Supplement.
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while ton under SA is the limitation ton - net tonnage plus 
the engine room space, the same as CLC 69.
2.4.3.4 Duration
The Supplement has a stated life o-f 5 years -from 20th Feb, 
1987. The question is: will it cease to be effective on 20th 
Feb. 1992 or will it be extended like the original TOVALDP? 
Although this has to be waited for, it is most likely that it 
will be extended.
2.4.4 Administration
TOVALDP is administered by the International Tanker Owners 
Pollution Federation Limited <IT0PF). A party to TOVALOP 
automatically becomes a member of the Federation. The 
Federation has some 3,200 members, operation 6,000 tankers.
The ITDPF takes measures to ensure that parties comply with 
the requirements in TOVALOP. They check if a participating 
owner has adequate financial security before they issue 
TOVALOP Certificates to his tankers as evidence of membership. 
They generally keep the functioning of the Agreement under 
review. However, there are only one or two out of the 20 
employees dealing with the TOVALOP administering job. Most of 
its work nowadays is to provide the service to respond to 
marine oil spills for its members.
2.5 CRISTAL <the Contract Regarding a Supplement to 
Tanker Liability -for Oil Pollution)
^ Sun, L. H., Report to On-the-Job Training. Malmo; WMU, 
1990. p4.
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2.5.1 Introduction
The relationship between CRISTAL and TOVALOP is just like that 
between CLC and FUND. Tanker owners bear responsibility under 
TOVALOP and. oil men contribute to the CRISTAL Fund to 
supplement the inadequate compensation provided by TOVALOP. 
The original name of the contract was the Contract Regarding 
an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution. 
Yet the acronym remains unchanged.
It was first agreed on January 14, 1971 and entered into force 
on April 1 that year, having then a coverage of 707. of the 
world’s receiving oil. Since then it has been amended from 
time to time to steadily increase the compensation level.
CRISTAL was originally devised to compensate only victims of 
oil pollution. Shipowner's relief was added later in 1972, 
after the establishment of FUND 71, in order to keep step with 
FUND. In 1973, it was amended to cover preventive measures 
before a spill and was again amended in 1978 to better mirror 
FUND 71. /
The latest and most substantial change has been effective from 
Feb. 22, 1987. In 1988, it was estimated that 807. of the oil 
transported by sea was owned by CRISTAL parties.* The 
discussion here is based on this current version.
2.5.2 Scope of Application
CRISTAL applies to incidents occurred anywhere in the world, 
irrespective whether CLC or FUND applies or not, if only at
* Guide to Oil Spill Compensation. London; ITDPF 
CRISTAL Ltd 1988. p 8.
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the time o-F the incident the oil is owned by a CRISTAL party. 
However, i-f the incident takes place where CLC and FUND are 
in -force, CRISTAL will, in addition to compensating any 
person (including tanker owner or bareboat charterer) for 
sustained pollution damage or incurred costs for removing 
threats, also undertake to pay an oil company party the same 
amount of money contributed by the company to lOPCF for the 
incident.
There are exemptions for CRISTAL. Pollution damage caused by a 
war act, a natural phenomenon, third party act or government 
negligence is excluded here. It follows the CLC 69 exoneration 
but diverges from the FUND 71 policy, which allows 
compensation to incident caused by "a natural phenomenon" and 
"a third party intentional act".
By Clause IV <D), CRISTAL is the last resort. It pays only 
when it can be shown that the claimant has exhausted all 
reasonable means of obtaining recovery from other sources.
2.5.3 Limit of Compensation
The present CRISTAL starts to compensate at the TOVALOP 
Supplement limit, and the limit under CRISTAL is:
Size of Tanker • US $
0-5,000 grt 36 M
5,000-140,000 grt plus 7
over 140,000 grt 135 M
per grt in excess
In the event that more 
incident, the CRISTAL 
largest tanker.
than one tanker is 
limit shall be
the polluter of 
determined by
the
the
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CRISTAL is further limited by a 2-year time bar from the date 
of the incident.
The unit of tonnage of a tanker is the same as TOVALOP 
Supplement, that is the gross registered tonnage as determined 
by the 1969 Tonnage Convention. It is also identical with 
Protocols 84 to CLC and FUND.
2.5.4 Administration
The Contract is administered by the Oil Companies Institute 
for Marine Pollution Compensation Ltd (Cristal Limited), a 
Bermuda-registered company. As at June 1, 1988, it has some 
700 members, covering 807. of the world’s receiving oil. The 
day to day handling of administrative matters and claims is 
dealt with by Marine Pollution Compensation Services Ltd 
(Cristal Services Limited), London, a subsidiary company of 
Cristal Ltd. It now has 3 staff members, headed by Mr. M. M. 
McCormack.
Cristal Ltd checks.'“the applications and collects contributions 
and periodic calls from oil companies.
Unlike lOPCF, Cristal Ltd keeps a low profile in attracting 
more members, probably due to the temporary nature of it and 
that it is considered by the oil sector a "self-imposing 
burden".
Until now, no oil companies from PRC ?< USSR have entered into 
CRISTAL.
2.6 PLATO (Pollution Liability Agreement among
Tanker Owners) & CRISTAL Revised =*85
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These short-lived regimes were developed only by the oil 
sector, essentially due to their di ssat i s-f act i on with the 84 
version o-f CLC and FUND, The oil companies were unhappy about 
the higher limit imposed by the 84 regimes. They wanted the 
small and medium sized tankers to bear more under CLC, thus 
reducing the responsibility oi^ the oil sector. They -further 
disagreed to a wider coverage to include unladen tanker, hence 
they put this -forward in 1985 PLATO and CRISTAL Revised. They 
were designed to be an interim solution pending the entrance 
into -force o-f the 84 Protocols o-f CLC and FUND.
PLATO had its limits in 2 phases:
0-5,000 grt 
5,000—105,000 grt 
>105,000 grt
pre-1990 
$ 10 M
plus $500/grt 
f 60 M
post-1990 
$ 15 M
plus $600/grt 
$ 75 M
Its counterpart, the CRISTAL Revised
^pre-1990
0-5,000 grt $ 50 N
5,000-105,000 grt plus $850/grt
’85 had limits: 
post-1990 
$ 50 M
plus $600/grt
(5,000-117,14 grt)
>105,000 grt $ 135 M $ 75 M
0117,143 grt)
PLATO and CRISTAL Revised ’85 was intended to replace TOVALOP 
and CRISTAL. As the overall result was the increased 
responsibility for tanker owners and decreased liability for 
the oil sector, the regimes were resisted heavily by tanker 
owners, represented by INTERTANKO (International Association 
of Independent Tanker Owners) and their insurers, the 
International Group of P S< I Clubs. In the end, the
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requirement -for entry into -force, that is 50 
tanker tonnage by March 31, 1986, never got met 
regimes "-foundered be-fore leaving port".
2.7 CLAIMS UNDER THE EXISTING REGIMES
Figures 4 S< 5 show the channels to claim for 
under existing regimes.
million grt 
and these 2
compensation
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FIGURE ^ COMPENSATION FOR OIL SPILLS FROM TANKERS
L i . .. .
Primary Compensation Supplementary Compensation
provided by provided by
Shipowners Cargo Owners
I ‘ T :T3
TOVALOP 
Standing 
Agreement
TOVALOP
Supplement CLC, 1969 CRISTAL
Fund
Convention,
1971
Nature of 
regime
Voluntary
plan
Voluntary
plan
international
convention
Voluntary
plan
International
converition
When does 
each apply?
When persistent , 
oil threatens to ; 
escape or does , 
escape from a 
participating 
tanker
Tanker is not 
required to be 
loaded with 
cargo and no 
spill need 
occur ____
I When persistent 
I oil threatens to 
[escape or does 
I escape from a 
I participating 
hanker
[Tanker must be 
[loaded with 
jCRlSTAL-owned 
[cargo although 
[no spill of cargo 
’ occur
When
persistent oil 
escapes from 
a laden tanker
No liability if 
tanker is 
unladen or if 
no oil is 
actually spilt
When persistent 
oil threatens to 
escape or does 
escape from a 
tanker
When
persistent oil 
escapes from 
a laden tanker
Tanker must be 
loaded with 
CRISTAL-owned 
cargo and 
compensation 
paid by tanker 
owner up 
to TOVALOP
Supplement
No liability if 
tanker is 
unladen or if 
no oil is 
actually spilt. 
Ownership of 
cargo irrelevant
Where can 
each apply?
Worldwide
Limits of 
Liability
• tr .
■i
US$160 per 
limitation ton up 
to maximum of 
US$16.8 million
9
V
n US$3.5 million 
Dfor tankers
H up to 5,000
H gross tons,
1 rising to 
■ maximum of
H US$70 million
US$181 per 
limitation ton up 
to maximum of 
US$19.1 million 
(see note 1)
. , .V. . —•
US$36 million 
for tankers up 
to 5,000 gross 
I tons, rising to 
I maximum of 
US$135 million, 
including 
compensation 
paid by tanker 
owner
Total made up 
to US$81.8 
million, 
including any 
compensation 
paid by tanker 
owner under 
CLC, 1969 
(see note 1)
Footnote 1: The limits of liability under the CLC, 1969 and Fund Convention, 1971 are based on 
specified units of account the US$ equivalents of which vary depending upon exchange rates. Those 
shown above have been converted, to the nearest round figure, at the rale of conversion applying as at 
1st June, 1988 (SDR = US$1,364) ________________

3 CHAPTER THREE FUTURE REGIMES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The existing regimes -for oil pollution liability and
compensation has been about 20 years old. With the development 
of the size of tanker and oil movement by sea, and especially 
with the inflation, what seemed an enormous compensation 
amount at the Torrey Canyon time is virtually nothing faced 
with the Exxon Valdez.
Ever since the operation of CLC, FUND, TOVALOP and CRIBTAL, 
there has been amendments to these regimes in order to cope 
with the compensation problem in the wake of the
intermittent happenings of incidents. There is no doubt that 
the compensation level should be increased. But who and to 
what extent should each involved party bear the liability has 
been undergone a long way towards a major achievement. 
Following heavy debates between oil and shipping sectors and 
among governments, a drastic change was introduced at the 
International Conference on Liability and Compensation for 
Damage in Connexion with the Carriage of Certain Substances by 
Sea under the auspices of IMO in 1984. The Protocols agreed in 
fact created 2 new convention, CLC 84 and FUND 84. Although 
they have not entered into force, or even if they might be 
aborted, the adopted policies in these 2 new conventions will 
no doubt much influence the future development in this 
respect. Therefore it worth its while to have an examination 
into these regimes and try to foresee the future.
3.2 CLC PROT 84 (the 1984 Protocol to Amend the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1969)
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At the diplomatic conference held at IMD headquarters in 
London from April 30, for 4 weeks to May 25, 1984, a new 
version of convention on civil liability for oil pollution - 
CLC 84 came into existence. This convention substantially 
raised the compensation level and also expanded the coverage 
of the convention.
3.2.1 Scope of Application
Sm 1F-
Ships under CLC 84 are entended, in addition to CLC 69, 
clearly to include not only when they actually carry oil in 
bulk but also for any voyage following such carriage.
Oil.
"Oil" mean any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil......".
Whale oil has been removed.
Poi_l_UT I ON Dn|v|AC3E:
Environmental impairment and pure threat situation has been 
taken into account. Therefore, the definition "polluttion 
damage" covers loss or damage by contamination, and costs of 
reasonable measures undertaken or to be undertaken to 'restore 
the environment. Cost of preventive measures is also included 
in pure threat situation.
Se;OQP?«F“M I CF«L. ScOF-E
The convention applies to pollution damage .caused not only in 
the territory and territorial sea, but also in the 200 
nautical miles exclusive economic zone.
3.2.2 Channelling of Liability
There is a list of cerrtain interested people whom no claim
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■for compensatiuon may be made against;
1. the servants or agents o-f the owner or crew members;
2. the pilot or any other person who provides services 
for the ship;
3. any charterer, manager or operator;
4. salvor;
5. any person taking preventive measures; and
6. all servants or agents of persons in the last three 
items.
The liability is channelled soly to the owner of the ship, the 
same as in the CLC 69.
For persons not listed here, say the shipyard, repairer, 
classification society etc, it is left open to the municipal 
law.
3.2.3 Limit of Liability and Conduct Barring the Right
3.2.3.1 Limit of Liability
The shipowner is strictly liable up to an enhanced level of 
the following:
ship size 
0 - 5,000grt 
5,000 - 140,000grt 
over 140,000grt
Liability 
SDR 3 M
plus SDR 420 per ,grt in excess 
SDR 59.7 M
This is the essential change in the Protocol S4. The new 
provision put heavy burden on small shipowners. Taken 3,000 
grt tanker for example, the owner is liable under CLC 69 for 
SDR 0.4 M, while under CLC 84 SDR it is 3 M, 7.5 times higher,
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comparing with a 3 times increase on the oil cargo sector in 
the FUND 84.
There are also changes to the units of account, which now is 
the SDR, same as in Protocol 76.
Gross tonnage, determined by the International Convention on 
Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969, is introduced to replace 
the limitation ton.
These are done to be in align with the generally accepted 
units in international conventions.
3.2.3.2 Conduct Barring the Right
The shipowner shall lose his right to limit if the pollution 
damage is resulted from his personal act or omission,
committed with intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and 
with knowledge that such damage would probably result. This 
wording, taken from the LLMC 76, is clearer and much 
restrictive than the CLC 69 wording. As Dr. Abecassis put it 
in his book*, the new right to limit is almost practically 
"unbreakable".
3.2.4 Amendment Procedure
For CLC 69, any amendment thereto will have to convene a 
diplomatic conference to be agreed upon.,This is time and 
energy consuming, rather difficult to make changes. This 
situation remained dominating for IMO conventions till 1973 
and 1974, when MARPOL 73 and SOLAS 74 came into being. These 
two conventions adopted a genius invention called "tacit
1 m t op • c= 1 t: • « p 244 ■
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procedure"Protocol 84 followed such policy by providing 
that an amendment shall be deemed to have been accepted unless 
a quarter of contracting party object. In so doing, there are 
some restrictions. That is no limit may be increased beyond 6"/. 
per year from Dec. 1, 1984 to the amendment adoption date, or 
3 times the 84 limits, whichever is lesser.
3.2.5 Requirement for Entry into Force
The Protocol 84 shall enter into force 12 months after 10 
states, including 6 each with not less than one million grt 
tanker tonnage, have ratified it. At present, there are 6 
contracting countries: Australia, France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Peru, South Africa and 11 other signatories.
3.3 FUND PROT 1984 (Protocol o-f 1984 to Amend the 
International Convention on the Establishment o-f an 
International Fund -for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 1971)
As its sister convention, CLC 69, FUND 71 was also amended at 
the 1984 Conference in London. By adopting the Protocol 84, 
the amended FUND 71 has become a new convention - FUND 84.==
3.3.1 Compensation
"Ship", "pollution damage", geographical scope etc is
identical with the CLC 84.
FUND 84 creates a new IDPC Fund, lOPC Fund 1984, which is
1 An aiM 1 1 b> m titmmmmd t C3 fed +
r>o mor~m on«*—-tH 1 nei o-f esontr-jactl dq qonmont:
1 XOP»C r»wnd Annu«X nwpor-ti, p AT* «
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legally different from the lOPC Fund 1969. Art 4 provides that 
IDF’CF 84 shall be liable for that part of pollution damage 
which the victims remain inadequately compensated under CLC 
84. Reasonable costs of preventive measures taken by the owner 
is also accounted for here.
However, it is exempted from such liability on the same 
grounds as FUND 76; war act, government ship or not a ship- 
generated incident.
There is also uncompensated area in the transitional period. 
This is provided by the proviso in Art 36 bis (b), when the 
pollution damage occurs in a state which is party only to FUND 
84 but not FUND 71. This state will be deemed to have been a 
party to FUND 71, and FUND 84 only compensates those part that 
is, above the FUND 71, leaving the part between CLC 84 and FUND 
71 uncompensated. See figure 3-2.
3.3.2 Limit of Compensation
Amending the limit was the most important aim of this 
Protocol. The final version adopted was originated from a US 
proposal. This was so done in order to attract the US joining 
the new regime. There are 2 limits here, one is the basic 
limit, the other is the expanded limit, which could not be 
achieved without the US’s accession to FUND 84.
3.3.2.1 Limit
Art 4 (4) provides that the total sum of' the amount payable 
under FUND 84 and the amount actually paid under CLC 84 shall 
not exceed SDR 135 M. This same limit applies in case where 
the damage is resulted from an exceptional natural phenomenon.
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Fig 6 Uncompensated Area
am 10,0001
The shadowed area is not compensated-
r ’
The SDR 1 35 M limit shall be expanded to 200 M with respect to 
any incident occurring during any period when there are three 
parties to this Convention which altogether received , during 
the preceding calendar year, contributing oil of 600 million 
tons or more.
This 600 million tons requirement can not be reached without 
the participation of the United States and 2 other large oil­
receiving countries such as Japan, Italy, France or the 
Netherlands. *■
X «i 9 op* e t 1: • p •
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The distribution of the amount available under FUND 84 shall 
be calculated at a pro rata basis.
Further amendment to the limit is the same as that contained 
in the CLC 84.
3.3.2.2 Abolition o-f Shipowner Relief
Another significant amendment is the deletion of Art 5 in FUND 
69. Therefore, under FUND 84, shipowners are no longer 
indemnified. This is taken into consideration as part of the 
overall increase of shipowner’s liability. It roughly accounts 
for one quarter of the CLC 69 liability.
3.3.2.3 Units
Units of account and tonnage have been amended to the 
internationally recognised SDR (for IMF members) and GRT, same 
as in CLC 84.
F'or non-IMF member^, such a unit equals to 15 gold francs. 
Such units of account shall be converted into national 
currency on the date of the decision of the Assembly of the 
FUND as to the first date of payment of compensation.
3.3.3 Administration
3.3.3.1 lOPC Fund 84
A new organization — lOPC Fund 84 — is created under 84 
Protocol, although the staff of lOPC 69 will be deployed for 
the entity to administer FUND 84. An amendment on the new 
lOPCF 84 is the deletion of the Executive Committee, whose 
rights and duties will be taken over by the Assembly and ad
54
hoc committees
3.3.3.2 Contributions to lOPCF 84
A significant change here to the FUND 69 is the removal of 
initial contributions. Art 11 has been deleted, aiming at 
facilitating the entry into force of the new convention.
The annual contribution method remains the same; general fund 
and major claims fund. A slight change is the lower boundary 
of expenditure constituting the major claims fund, now being 
SDR 4 M.
3.3.4 Requirement for Entry into force
Art 30 of FUND Protocol 84 provides that it shall enter into 
force 12 months following the date on which at least 8 states, 
with at least 600 million tons of contributing oil during the 
preceding calendar year, have become parties to it. However, 
it shall not enter into force before the CLC 84 enters into 
force. t
At present, there are 2 contracting parties: France and FRG. 
There are 10 other signatories.
3-4 Comparison with other regimes
For the convenience o-^ comparison with different limitations 
under various regimes, it is taken that one grt equals to 0.92 
<0.91875) limitation ton, which is used in ITOPF booklet.’■ 
Fig. 7 and Table 2 show the differences among the regimes.
A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation. London: ITOPF Zt
CRISTAL Ltd., 1988. p4.
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3.5 Perspective o-f the Future Regimes
These protocols had been laid aside since its coming into 
existence -for 5 years until the Exxon Valdes disaster took 
place in March 1989 in Alaska, USA. The incident soon caught 
world’s attraction among other things, on the increasing need 
to have a higher compensation under an international umbrella. 
Particular attention has been given to the requirement o-f 
entry into force for these 2 protocols. As we have seen from
3.2 and 3.3 in the chapter, the entry into force of. the 2 
protocols depends much on the attitude of the US. Therefore, 
it is very important to look into the topic in the States.
3.5.1 Debate in the US
Disaster in nature is the Exxon Valdes, it is on the other 
hand a catalyst for the US government and the public to turn 
their attention to oil pollution liability and compensation 
problems.
/
Governmemt
The US government has, for a long time, the intention to join 
CLC .?< FUND. In May 1970, President Nixon believed that "the 
danger of oil pollution is an urgent matter for international 
regulation" and tried to seek the approval of Congress for the 
participation of CLC 69.^ The Reagan administration again 
expressed their willingness to become party to both the CLC 69 
Zc FUND 71.
Now under the Bush regime, the Secretary of Transportation,
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Hr. Skinner, in his report to the President on the Exxon 
Valdez incident, recommended that the Protocols should be 
implemented into a comprehensive US system for liability and 
compensation as soon as possible.^
All of these administrations well understood that oil 
pollution problems cannot effectively be solved exclusively as 
a national problem.
However, US Senate is not of such opinion and a long debate 
has been in the way in the Congress as to the ratification of 
Protocols 84.
However, US Senate is not of such opinion and a long debate 
has been in the way in the Congress as to the ratification of 
Protocols 84.
The Senate is not in favor of the Protocols. Senator George 
Mitchell of Maine, as Chairman of the Environmental Protection 
subcommittee in rfecent years, resisted the federal 
comprehensive oil spill legislation and the passage of the 
Protocols. He introduced unlimited shipowner and cargo 
liability in his own bill, S. 686. There are no provisions for 
the Protocols and it didn’t pre-empt state laws in any way. 
This bill was passed last August. It is favored by 
environmentalists and states.
House oe Rep>'F5ESEmx#=>x i ve
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The House of Representative has a different point of view. It 
passed H.R. 1465 on Nov. 9, 1989. It provides for the 
implementation of the 84 Protocols, although it too would not 
preempt state law. shipowner’s liability was $600 per grt and 
the cargo owner another $600 per grt.
As at June this year, the debate in Congress was concentrating 
on whether comprehensive oil spill legislation should contain 
the 2 protocols.^ In an attempt to break the impasse over the 
protocols, Mr. G. Studds proposed a new compromise solution. 
It allows the US to participate in the protocols for 5 years, 
when the President would renounce US participation unless it 
is proved that;®
(1) participation by the US in the conventions has 
not been, and will not be, any less effective than 
Federal and state laws in preventing incidents and 
is guaranteeing full and prompt compensation for 
damages resulting from incidents, and
(2) the conventions have been revised adequately to 
make them comparable to this Act, including with 
respect to;
a) standards of, defenses to, and limits 
on liability for an incident; and
b) the scope and measures of damages 
(including natural resources damages) 
recoverable for an incident."
The proposal also directs that the 84 Conventions do not
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preempt any claim under a law other that the Conventions that 
are not recoverable under the Conventions. This proposal was 
welcomed by the Administration. This proposal is still on its 
way to be ratified.
3.5.2 International Pressure
As the Protocols were so structured that, without the 
participation of the US which receives most oil that any other 
single country, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, 
for them to enter into force. Therefore, contracting parties, 
now 6 to CLC 84 and 2 to FUND 84, as well as other states will 
be discouraged if the US fails to ratify the protocols. This 
is true also since the 84 protocols were based much on a US 
proposal and now it refuses to ratify them!
The shipping and oil cargo industry, for fearing that the us 
legislators would impose unlimited liability on then or very 
high limitation, is much in favor of the 84 protocols.
Intertanko, the tanker owner's representative, stands at the 
forefront promoting the US's ratification of the 2 protocols. 
In 1989 especially, Intertanko spent much time and energy 
lobbying the US parliament. It monitored the process in the 
Congress debate, submitted letters to the Senate's Committee 
on Foreign Relations*, the Senate's Subcommittee on 
Environmental Protection and the House of Representative's 
Subcommittee on Water Resources. In March this year, when this 
author
visited the Intertanko office in Oslo, Mr. K.R. Fuglesang said 
that they were going to intensify its activities in 
Washington. In addition to having Rear Admiral Sidney A.
X Z o AnmuAdRl X*^O^t p 23 #or* uiX 1
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Wallace as its counsel, it also retained the Washington law 
firm Dyer, Ellis, Joseph and Mills, and an arrangement was 
made with a public relations firm to deal with press aspects.
The London-based lOPC Fund secretariat is also very concerned 
about the US action. It urged the US to ratify early the 2 
protocols.
A shipowner faces unlimited compensation claims if its vessel 
spills oil in the States. Absence of negligence is. not a 
defence. This situation makes the owners very worried at 
trading with US. They themselves have to take some action in 
order to safeguard business.
Shell announced in June that its tanker fleet would no longer 
trade to the US mainland for fear of the risks. Elf 
Aquitaine - the French oil giant - followed Shell in not 
calling at US mainland ports. The French energy group will 
also toughen up its chartering procedures.^
The fact of stoppirfg calling at US ports has certainly put 
pressure on the Congress to ratify the 84 protocols.
3.5.3 Advantage for the US
Both the existing statuary regimes and the 84 Protocols are 
aimed at an expeditious compensation for damage caused by oil 
pollution from ships, and the CLC 69 and FUND 71 have been 
successfully proved this point. The protocols, having improved 
the current regimes to a great extent, are expected to do more
1 C5ml gH 9 -to *foXXow ShiwX X In U® por*ts •* *
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so. The US will no doubt-bene-fit once ratifying them.*
1) The claims procedure is simple -for the claimants since 
the liability is channelled to the shipowner.
2) The cover under Protocol 84 will cover all the claims 
up to now, except the Exxon Valdes.^
3) The protocols provide -for a uniform system of 
compensation acceptable to most nations.
4) Protocols would grant automatic jurisdiction in US 
courts over the owner of a foreign flag vessel
5) They provide an internationally enforceable system, 
far superior to the situation prevailing where one 
pollution incident falls under the jurisdiction of 2 or 
more court systems with widely varying regulations.
6) P S< I clubs are unwilling to insure, or at a high 
premium to insure, vessels calling at US ports. This will 
remain so if the US fails to ratify these protocols.
7) US shipowners will be better protected. Although there 
are voluntary schemes, these schemes were designed only 
for an interim purpose. The existing TOVALOP and CRISTAL 
will be terminated in 1992.
8) 84 protocols have extended damage caused to EEZ. The 
US's participation will safeguard spills caused in EEZ, 
which would have covered the Norwegian tanker "Mega Borg" 
that exploded on June 10, 1990, 60 miles offshore. Under 
the current international law, coastal states have 
limited authority over it.
9) Diplomatically good for US. The protocols' limits were 
based on the US proposal and many countries have given in
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in order to attract the US. Failure of joining will 
disappoint the others and the US would lose its 
credibility, leading to disadvantages in future 
negotiations within the international maritime community. 
Ratification, on the other hand, will demonstrate that 
the US is ready to participate in the international 
solution of environmental problems.
10) Finally, as Congressman G. Studds pointed out in his 
letter to meeting of Congress:^ "A global oil pollution 
liability and compensation system is in the best 
interests of the US". Even though the 84 protocols are 
currently unsatisfactory to the US and should be amended, 
"only through participation in the protocols will the US 
be able to negotiate their improvement".
3.5.4 Fate of the 84 Protocols
3.5.4.1 CLC Protocol 84
As mentioned in 3.1.5, the requirement for CLC 84 is 10 
contracting states,' including 6 each with more than one 
million grt tanker tonnage. After reaching this target, it 
will enter into force 12 months later.
Now there' are 5 contracting parties to CLC 84, among which 
France and FRG have more than 1 million grt.
There are 11 signatories not having ratified it (See Annex II) 
but keeping watch on the US Congress debate. If the US is to 
include the 2 protocols in its comprehensive oil spill 
legislation, the rest of the signatories and others will be 
encouraged to ratify the protocols. Among the above-mentioned
X Ocs«»4Rn» P*ollcsv • aianw l "f VO. p <£> .
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signatories, China, Denmark and the UK each has more than a 
100 million grt tanker -fleet. These countries, together with 
some other countries such as Italy and Japan, will most likely 
be encouraged to join within 2 years time.
There-fore, i-f the US is to rati-fy it this year or next, 
Protocol 84 might be able to reach its requirement o-F 10 
parties and 6 million ton grt around the end of S3, hence it 
would come into force in the year 1994.
Even if the US does not ratify it, there is still a slight 
chance for CLC 84 to come into force, just as has happened to 
CLC 69. In that case, six or more years will have to waited 
f or.
3.5.4.2 FUND Protocol 84
A similar provision of 8 states with 600 million tons of 
contributing oil is required for FUND 84 to come into 
operation.
f.
Theoretically, this can be reached without US participation. 
That is when the 5 largest participating parties to FUND 71 
plus any one country become parties. But if the US, the 
world-’s largest oil importer, does not join. Japan, which 
constitutes 26.67. of the 857 million ton FUND 71 contributing 
oil in 1988*, is most likely to follow, and so will some 
other countries. This will make the entry into force virtually 
impossible.
As mentioned in 3.4.2, US participation is still under debate 
in Congress. The possible outcome for that might be a
1 X OF*C P'tjind AmniuMl » 1 . p ^7.
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compromise, that is, ratification subject to certain 
conditions.
If the US is to join, FUND 84 may come into force some 2 or 3 
years later than its counterpart, CLC 84.
3.5.5 Analysis of the Regimes in Future Applications
Before Feb 20, 1992, the applicable regimes will remain the 
same: CLC 69, FUND 71, TO VALOR CRISTAL.
If Protocol 84 does not take effect before 1992, the present 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL will be most likely to be extended for 
some further years before its termination.
More complex is in the transitional period, so called in 
Protocols 84, when the applicable regimes, in addition to 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL (whether further revised or not), will be 
made up by the co-existence of CLC 69 84, FUND 71 84, or
their combination, dependent on the entry into force of 84 
Protocols. The applicable regimes for a state party both to 
CLC 69 and FUND 71:
1. Phased-in solution
CLC 69------------- --------------------- E
FUND 71-----------------------------------E
CLC 84 S-------------------- ---------------
FUND 84 S-----------------------
phase 1 phase 2 phase 3 phase 4
TIME ---------- *---------- *------------*-----------
E: end S: start
There exists an 18- month transitional period: phase 2
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is the co-existence period o-f alland phase 3. Phase 3 
di-f-ferent regimes.
2. Delayed denunciation solution
CLC 69 --------
FUND 71 --------
CLC 84 
FUND 84
phase 1
TIME -------------------------------
There is no transitional period here.
Ttie immediate denunciation option
E
E
S-----------
3----------
phase .4 
OK----------
CLC 69------------------------ E
FUND 71------------------------ E
CLC 84 S--------------------
FUND 84 8---------
phase 1 phase 2S<3 phase 4
TIME ------------------------ *---------- )K--- -----
4. CLC 84 only option
CLC 69------------------------ E
FUND 71-------------------------E
CLC 84 8
So, there exists a period, a-fter the entry into -force o-f 84 
Protocols, o-f mixed convention parties . Dr. Abecassis has 
analysed some theoretical cases in his book.*- The -following 
countries may co-exist in the -future;
1 1 » • op • csttia* pp 1 •
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CLC 69 parties;
CLC 69 FUND 71 parties;
CLC 84 parties;
CLC 84 FUND 84 parties;
CLC 69 CLC 84 parties;
CLC 69, CLC 84 & FUND 84 parties;
CLC 69, FUND 71 ?< CLC 84 parties;
CLC 69, FUND 71, CLC 84 FUND 84 parties;
Meanwhile, TOVOLOP and CRISTAL may also exist and applicable 
to their member vessels, adding more complexity and confusion.
Uniformity at an international stage cannot be really achieved 
without each state’s active participation in the new regimes.
/
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4 CHAPTER IV OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION IN PR CHINA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.1.1 General Shipping Introduction
China is a large continental country on the west coast o-f the 
Pacific. It has a coastline of 18,000 kilometers along its 
mainland and 14,000 kilometers around its islands. Shipping, 
has long been a very important means of transport for domestic 
and foreign trade.
As early as 2000 years ago, in the reign of Han Dynasty, 
foreign trading vessels had been received by Southern Chinese 
ports.‘ In the Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644 AD), Chinese
shipping was already the most advanced one in the world. Its 
fleet sailed to Ceylon, India, the Persian Gulf and Africa.^®
However, the real boom of a modern fleet is of only 40 years 
old. It has developed from 201 ships, 402,417 grt to the 
present 1,907 ships, totalling 13.5 million grt, 3.17. of world 
total .=
4.1.2 Oil Industry
Despite that petroleum was known in China some 900 years ago 
and the first oil well was drilled in Sichuan Province in
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Table 3
Chinese Merchant Fleet 1960-1989
Year No.
1960 201
1961 212
1962 219
1963 215
1964 216
1965 213
1966 231
1967 247
1968 239
1969 237
1970 248
1971 265
1972 286
1973 323
1974 360
1975 466
1976 551
1977 622
1978 713
1979 846
1980 955
1981 1,051
1982 1 , 108
1983 1,179
1984 1,262
1985 1,408
1986 1,562
1987 1,773
1988 1,841
1989 1,907
Gross Tonnage
402,417 
472,677 
522,481 
502,038 
535,427 
551,143 
669,299 
772,125 
765,545 
791,893 
867,994 
1,022,256 
1,181,179 
1,478,992 
1,870,567 
2,828,290 
3,588,726 
4,245,446 
5,168,898 
6,336,747 
6,837,608 
7,653,195 
8,056,849 
8,674,599 
9,300,358 
1O,568,236 
11,566,974 
12,341,477 
12,919,876 
13,513,578
Source; Lloyd’s Register o-f Shipping Statistical Tables, 1989. 
p 30.
Note: Ships under 100 grt are not included.
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China in 1521*, the large scale oil production started only 
from 1960s, when Daqing oil field (now it has become a city) 
was discovered. With the new technology for oil exploration 
and exploitation, oil industry grew drastically from 1 million 
tons in 1956= to 136 million tons in 1988 (see Table 4-2). 
China now is the 5th largest oil producing country in the 
world.
Table 4 Oil Production in China
YEAR PRODUCTION CONSUMING BALANCE
(mill tons) (mill tons) (mill tons)
1975 77.0 68.1 8.9
1980 105.8 90.3 15.5
1981 101.0 -
1982 101.7
1983 106.0
1984 114.5 87.8 26.7
1985 124.9 97.3 27.6
1986 130.7 101.4 29.3
1987 132.9 104.0 28.9
1988 136.1 106.0 30.18
Source: Shipping Statistics Year Book, 1989, ISL. Bremen
pp 108,112.
3. c:on^r~ol 0*1^ Oil f*ol 1 iati 1 on ^ i-om ppl nQ
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4.1.3 Oil Transport
4.1.3.1 Overall Volume
Meanwhile, oil transport volume has also been increased. The 
major oil -fields are located mainly in the north eastern part 
o-f China, such as Daqing and Liaohe oil -fields, representing 
50.4'/. o-f the total production. While B6V.^ o-f this has to be 
shifted to the southern part, where the major refineries and 
other heavy industries are.
The majority of oil movement is dome by water transport. Table
4-3 shows that in 1986, waterborne oil transport reached 84 
million tons, among which 66 million was done by sea.
With the further development of national oil industry, the 
waterborne oil volume is expected to reach 100 M tons in 1990 
and 180 M tons in 2000. =*
It is worthwhile to mention that along with the "open door" 
policy for Chinese^ economic reform, oil export has also 
increased, (see Table 4-2) These exports are transported by 
national as well as foreign fleet. There were about 400 - 500 
foreign flag tankers calling at Chinese ports.
4.1.3.2 Tanker Fleet
To cope up with the oil industry, China- also maintains a 
tanker fleet for the oil transportation. As at Jan. 1, 1989,
1 v.l«-. VI, cap. cl-fc. p tazs.
SS *' A V > In CH1 nm « f^X WT • op » p C9.
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Table 5 Waterborne Oil Transport in China
Units: million tons
Years Oil Total Sea Ri ver
1979 Petroleum 50.17 36.79 13.38
Crude oi1 39.48 29.69 10.15
1980 Petroleum 52.95 38.62 14.33
Crude oil 40.95 30.00 10.95
1981 Petroleum 51.94 38.66 13.28
Crude oi1 39.59 29.57 10.02
1982 Petroleum 53.39 39.98 13.41
Crude oil 40.61 30.42 10.19
1983 Petroleum 59.86 44.71 15.15
Crude oil 42.44 31.13 11 .31
1984 Petroleum 68.03 52.17 15.86
Crude oi1 49.78 37.77 12.01
1985 Petroleum 79.00 63.36 15.64
Crude oil 59.49 47.69 11.80
1986 Petroleum 83.71 65.80 17.91
Crude oil 61.18 47.82 13.34
Note: Crude oil is .part of the petroleum here.
Source: "A Study on the Establishment o-f An Oil Pollution Fund 
in China". Beijing: Research Institute of Water Transportation 
, HOC. 1988. Table 2.
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Table 6 Tanker Fleet Profile in China
1989.1.1
size 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 7500 10000
ton -999 -1999 -2999 -3999 -4999 -7499 -9999 -15000
no. 10 29 3 32 6 29 7 5
lOOOdwt 5.8 40.2 6.5 112.2 28.7 157.5 59.6 62.1
size
ton
15000 
-19999
20000
-29999
30000
-39999
40000
-49999
50000
-59999
60000
-69999
70000
79999
total
no. 25 22 6 Am 6 9 1 192
lOOOdwt 411.0 552.9 193.6 87.7 321.1 561.0 75.5 2675
age 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25- total
no. 9 20 53 42 30 38 192
y.dwt 1 L_iL_j 100
Source: Shipping Statistics Yearbook 1989. Bremen: ISL. pp 52,
XmUj'm.* m
These figures are calculated from "Lloyd’s Register of 
Shipping Statistical Tables 1987". p 29. Therefore, it should not 
be treated as exact figures on 1989.1.1.
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there were 192 oil tankers (300 grt and over), with 2.7 
million deadweight tonnage, 1.1*/. o-f world total. Most of these 
tonnage was owned by COSCO Dalian Branch and Shanghai Maritime 
Transportation Bureau. Others are owned by local companies and 
companies under the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
4.2 Oil Pollution in China
The boom of oil industry and oil transportation inevitably has 
led to an increase of pollution incidents in Chinese waters.
4.2.1 Operational Pollution from Ships
China is a contracting party to Marpol 73/78 and SOLAS 74/78. 
They entered into force for China on Oct. 2, 1983 and March 
17, 1983 respectively. PRC’s vessels have been fully in 
compliance with these regulation and the Chinese authority, 
the Harbor Superintendency Administration, also undertakes the 
port state control those visiting vessels.
Nevertheless, so Iqpg as a vessel carries oil or it has fuel 
oil as bunker on board, the operational pollution will always 
occur: Oil may be overflowed during loading; there may be 
leakage in the process of transfer of oil either from ship to 
ship or from terminal to ship; illegal pumping out of dirty 
ballast water and legitimate discharge of tank cleaning water, 
oily ballast, machinery space bilges etc.
So far, there is no official statistics on the operational oil 
pollution and it is not easy to collect these data. However, 
it is interesting to look at a figure given by Mr Yi in his 
paper "The Control of Oil Pollution from Shipping
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9Activities"^. He suggested , by purely theoretical 
calculation, a rough -figure between 5,000 - 5,500 tons 
annually dumped to sea from Chinese ships. This amount has 
certainly contributed to the detriment of marine environment. 
But as the ballast water etc is mostly discharged far away 
from coast and only when the ship is navigating thus oil is 
better absolved by sea water, what a seemingly high proportion 
of operational pollution might not be that serious. Since 
operational discharge is legitimated under international 
conventions and normally not covered by international 
liability regime, a detailed discussion will not be included 
in this work.
However, it might be of use to point out that operational 
discharge is strictly controlled to be in accordance with the 
Regulations Concerning the Prevention of Pollution of Sea 
Areas by Vessels, PRC and any violator of it may be, in 
addition to the compensation for the damage, subject to a fine 
of RMB 100,000 (roughly $ 21,000)
4.2.2 Pollution frjom Offshore Industry
Although this is also not within the scope of this work, it is 
worthwhile to have a look into the offshore oil pollution 
simply to integrate the marine oil pollution situation in 
China. Almost from the start of the Chinese offshore oil 
industry, there came the offshore oil spills. As can be seen 
from Table 7, there was a major spill in 1978, when not only 
113 tons of crude oil flowed out but also loss of lives was 
resulted.
3. Vi, V*F*» cap • c 1 t: • pp 0<£> — •
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Date Amount (ton)
Table 7 Qf-fshore Oil Spills 
Location pollution source
197805 Central Bohai Drilling platform 113
19790509 Bohai Production platform 
Bohai No. 4
6.6
197907 Bohai port Drilling ship
Bohai No. 3
14
197908 Bohai Production platform 
Bohai No. 4
38
19810214 Bohai port Supply ship 5.7
19860820 Bohai Supply ship 3.5
Source: Lu, M. Z., Oil Spill Prevention and Treatment in 
0-ffshore Oil Industry o-f China, Oil Spill Conference 1989, 
USA. p 236•
Since the offshore oil industry is fastening its step to have 
more exploitation, it is almost certain that both operational 
and oil spill pollution thereto will be more significant to 
the marine environment and should be paid be more attention 
to.
4.2.3 Accidental Spills from Ships in China
f
It is the accidental■spi11s that cause much damage and much 
public newsworthy. If the oil is spilled in a coastal tourist 
place, such as the Feoso Ambassador in Qingdao, 1983, the 
damage and consequential impact is much greater.
4.2.3.1 Frequency of Spills
As is shown in Table 6, and Fig 8, there were 386 occurrences 
of oil pollution in China during 1976 - 1986, with an average 
of 35 incidents each year. Most of these were minor incident 
with less that 1 ton oil spilled. They constituted 787. of the 
total accidents.
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There were 12 major incidents (or significant spills, as 
defined by IHO for spills over 100 tons of oil). See Table 9. 
These spills concentrated on 3 parts; Qingdao, Shanghai and 
South Guangdong.(see Fig 9) Such major spi11s occurs on an 
average of once a year.
It is noted from Table 9 that since 83, more foreign flag 
tankers have been involved in the accidents.
4.2.3.2 Amounts of Spills
As illustrated by Table 7, a total amount of 1,6362.2 tons of 
oil was poured into the sea, averaging 1,487 ton per year.
This was due mainly from spills of more than 100 tons, which 
accounts for 98X. Therefore, for ease to analysis, spills 
under 100 tons may be neglected. The Table also shows that in 
the past several years time,'accident over 1000 tons of oil 
were dominating the significant spills, such large amount of 
oil spilled certainly cause much more damage to the marine 
environment.
The single largest oil spill is the Nanyang accident. The 
Nanyang tanker was owned by Hongkong Ocean Shipping Co. with a 
Somalia flag. She was carrying 16,488 tons of Chinese crude 
oil on her way from Qingdao to Zhanjiang on February 16, 1976. 
She then collided in heavy fog with a Netherlands vessel at
115.42.5 E, 22.24.5 N and sank into the sea, resulting in a 
spill of 8000 tons of crude and fuel oil. The oil soon spread 
to the coastal beach, severely damaged the fishery and 
aquaculture etc. Compensation for the spill was 7.9 million 
RMB, including 1.5 million RMB for cleanup cost.
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Table 8
Frequency o-f Oil Spills in China
1976 - 1986
Year
1
z □ 0-lT 1-lOT lO-lOOT >100T
1976 16 o•C. 8 3 3
1977 25 IS 6 0 1
1978 24 16 6 0 2
1979 23 20 2 0 1
1980 35 24 10 1 0
1981 41 32 8 1 0
1982 43 37 h 0
1983 45 41 2 0
1984 35 26 5 1 3
1985 53 46 5 0
1986 46 39 6 1 0
Total 386 301 64 9 12
Table 9
Amounts o-f Oil Spills in China 
1976 - 1986
Year No C 0-lT 1-lOT lO-lOOT
V o o —!
1976 8611.6 0.8 20.8 60.0 8530.0
1977 375.5 4.5 21.0 0.0 350.0
1978 861.4 1.9 25.5 0.0 834.0
1979 358.5 1.0 2.5 0.0 355.0
1980 55.9 3.9 12.0 40.0 0.0
1981 38.9 6.9 22.0 10.0 0.01982 17.4 6.4 11.0 0.0 0.0
1983 4101.3 3.3 5.0 0.0 4093.0
1984 1871.3 2.8 6.5 20.0 1842.0
1985 32.8 3.8 9.0 20.0 0.0
1986 37.7 4.1 12.6 21.0 0.0
Total 16362.3 39.4 147.9 171.0 16004.0
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Table 10
Compensation o-f Oil Spills in China
1976 - 1986
Year No 0-lT 1-lOT lO-lOOT > 1OOT
1976 7 0 4 1 2
1977 1 0 0 0 1
1978 4 1 3 0 0
1979 0 0 0 0
1980 8 5 3 0
1981 14 12 2 0
1982 9 6 3 0
1983 13 8 2 1
1984 12 7 1 2
1985 9 5 4 0
1986 11 10 1 0
Total 88 54 2-3 4 7
Source: "A Study on the Establishment o-f An Oil Pollution Fund
in China". Beijing: Research Institute o-f Water 
Transportation, MOC. 1988. Table 3.
/
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Figure 8 Frequency of Oil Spills in China
Tb51'
Source: Compiled from RJWT, 19SS. Table 3.
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Table 11
Significant Oil Spills in China, 1976-1986
Date Vessel Flag Spill Place Compensation
(ton) ( ’OOOrmb)
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II IIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
760216 Nanyang* Somalia 8000 Shantou
Guangdong
7920
760217 Biyangwan* Japan 200 Haifeng 
Guangdong
800
760623 Honghu China 330 Weihai
770531 Ocean Liberia
Harvest*
350 Nanao Island 2000
7B0426 Daqing 412 China 655 Shanghai
780708 Daqing 401 China 179 Shanghai
790619 President Brazil
Si 1 as*
355 Qingdao 1000
831011 Daqing 236 China 750 Jieshi Gulf 
Guangdong
831125 Feoso Panama
Ambassador
3343 Qingdao 17750
840405 Licheng* Panama 685 Henglan Island
Guangdong
840511 Haili* Panama 400 Wenzhou 940
840928 Jacui Brazil 757 Qingdao 5250
Total 12 16004 35660
* Translation name -from Chinese version.
Source: Research Institute of Water Transport, op, cit., Table 
4.
4.2.3.3 Claims for Compensation
Among the total compensation of 37.5 million RMB, 35.7 Million 
(9571) was claimed against the 12 largest oil spills. This 
shows the significance of the damage from 12 out of the total 
386 incidents. This 37. of total pollution occurrences also 
tells us that major pollution accidents should be taken 
greater concern of.
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Figure 9 Location of Significant Spills in China
A Location
S3
The largest claim for compensation in China was against the 
Feoso Ambassador, a Panamanian tanker, owned at the time of 
incident by the Hongkong based Feoso Oil Ltd. On November 25, 
1983, this 45,406 tons dwt tanker was carrying 43,934 tons of 
Shengli crude oil from Qingdao to the Philippines, where the 
owner of the cargo, Philippine National Oil Company located. 
Soon after the pilot left the tanker, she went aground on 
Zhongsha Reef, off the Port of Qingdao, resulting in 3,343 
tons of oil leaking out. Despite the deployment of skimmers 
and booms and successful salvage of the tanker, the 6-8 
scale north wind in the following day drove most of the oil 
onto the coast. Soon, 230 km of shoreline in the Jiaozhou Bay 
was polluted, among which 4.7 km was heavily polluted, 
covering 147,000 M=. The oil layer on the beach amounted to as 
much as 40 cm.*’
The Feoso Ambassador is considered as the Torrey Canyon in 
China. Qingdao is the most beautiful summer resort in Northern 
China. It is also an important fishing, light industry city. 
The oil spill has brought great'damages to the city and 
resulted in catastrophic losses and damages to the coastal 
factories, military installations, tourism, fishing and 
aquaculture etc.
A claim was lodged against the shipowner totalling RNB 28.3 
million <then about us $ 14 M), RNB 11 M for cleanup and RMB
17.3 for loss or damage to aquaculture.^ The claim was then
1 L.AO , Hui 1 f o*f ^hiV Amfe94R»i»-«clor' D«r 1 nq
F**! 1 ** « Oexrxin i. on . IMo • 3, R X 4 •
wJldRriQv Vl« **Xhi«» R«»omo Amia or- " « Ocr
Xr-mn»por-'t4>it:± on . No. pp 30 — 3^.
SS Clmlm or- Comt: C5p«rrit: on Cl omnuip o-f 0X1 RollLA’blon
P V R«ro»o AmPxiwxiclor' « *fr-om t:H«t Env'l r-onm«»nti Rr-otocrtl on
Siur-oxiut o*f 01 nQclAO « Chilnx^ o t: hi o 8*b.«»«mmhil p Nuit: uim 1 LJnclor- wr~ i ±. ± n q
Afl»»oe 1 1 on L-^d • ActQ . lO^
OlAlm Oil Rollia1::ton iio AciuiA'blc: Rr-od(jtc='t:«
O L.1 m w d to V hi w Roowo Amtoxiwoxidor-« -f r~ om ^ hi RX mhi«vr-l mm 73i-Ar- m-mK-K o*f
OX n Qd«io V ChkXn4K t o t:hi«» S^ommmhilp Mu(*b uim 1 Ondor-wr-1 t: X riQ
Axwocsl X on L.t:d. A«aQ . 2, 19S4.
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mediated to RMB 17.75 M in 1985, among which RMB 11,296,569 
eKceeded the CLC 69 limit and was paid by Cristal Ltd.
This is the first time when the claim is higher than the CLC 
limit. This point and the fact of catastrophic damage shocked 
the whole country and as a fallout, considerations of national 
contingency plan, oil pollution legislation, especially the 
study on the necessity to join lOPC FUND has been put on the 
agenda.
Ill-fated was Qingdao, only 10 months after the disaster of 
Feoso Ambassador, there came another accident. The Brasilian 
tanker, Jacui, grounded on the damned Zhongsha Reef again on 
September 28, 1984, spilling 758 tons of crude oil. However, 
the damage claim did not exceed the CLC limit and the 
compensation for the loss or damage was RMB 5.25 M.
4.3 Pollution Legislation in China
4.3.1 Introduction to Legislative System
China began to manage its industries and all other activities 
by law rather than central planning and administrative orders 
in the late 70s, when the full scale economic reform took its 
step in China.
With the introduction of private enterprises, "getihu" as is 
called in Chinese, the previous centralized system , which has 
been adapted or the state-owned and collective enterprises, 
could no longer be suitable for the promotion and control of 
its industries. This is particular true, when "open door" 
policy was adopted, attracting more and more foreign
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investment in China.
Like in any other countries, there are national laws and local 
laws. For the purpose o-f this work, it is only the national 
level legislative that are concerned and discussed. These 
nation wide law can be categorised according to the 
legislative bodies into 3 levels;
Congressional laws;
State Council laws; and 
Ministerial regulations.
4.3.2 Congressional Laws
The National People’s Congress (NPC) Assembly is the supreme 
legislative body in China. Through its various committees, it 
takes up the most important legal issues and sets -fundamental 
laws in the highest level. Congress!onal laws take their forms 
and will be effective after the signing of the Chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the NPC. Other inferior laws and 
regulations are established according to the congressional 
parent laws.
At present, oil pollution and related laws adopted by NPC are;
Environmental Protection Law of PRC, 1979 
Marine Environmental Protection Law of PRC, 1982 
Maritime Traffic Safety Law, 1983
Those under development are;
Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Law 
Exclusive Economic Zone Law 
Oil Exploitation Law
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Maritime Law 
Harbor Law etc .
4.3.3 State Council Laws and Regulations
The State Council is the central government in China. It 
comprises o-f a Prime Minister, 3 vice premiers, several state 
councilors and all ministers. Major legal issues or matters 
which involve inter-mi nisterial cooperation, are usually 
referred to the State Council. These instruments, after,the 
approval and signature of either the Prime Minister, or a vice 
premier or s state councillor, will come into being. Regarding 
marine oil pollution, there are several legal instruments in 
force:
Regulations Concerning the Prevention of Pollution of Sea 
Areas by Vessels, 1983
Regulations Concerning the Environmental Protection in 
Offshore Oil Exploration Exploitation, 1983 
Regulations Concerning the Dumping of Wastes at Sea, 1985 
Regulations Governing supervision and Control of Foreign 
Vessels by PRC, 1979
4.3.4 Ministerial Regulations
Under the state Council, there are mainly 3 ministries 
concerned with marie oil pollution:
Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environment, 
Ministry of Communications,
Ministry of Agriculture and fishery and one agency - 
State Oceanic Administration.
mor-o r-mm-T mr- to r'mn , Z hi 1 J i «r «tncn
"Ccsomt:*! Zona* o-f cninaa", Mmr-±ni» P'oXic-y'. aul v
pp SO«?» — 31SS.
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The regulations promulgated by these ministries are developed 
upon the delegated responsibilities -from the State Council. 
They are of detailed nature and are applied nationally.
Since environmental problems-are now on the priority* list and 
normally considered at State Council level, there are not many 
regulations at ministerial level. Some of them are:
Information Management Rules of Offshore Oil Resources 
Seawater Quality Criteria
Regulation of Investigation and Treatment of Marine 
Accidents etc
4.3.5 Administrative Orders and Directives
There are many directives or administrative orders issued by 
Ministries or departments thereunder to fully implement the 
laws in a detailed and more practicable manner.
4.3.6 International Conventions in China
r
4.3.6,1 General
With a merchant fleet of 13,513,578 grt, China stands no. 7 in 
the world.* Since late 70s, China has been active in the 
maritime world. Not only China’s participation is significant 
to the international maritime community, but also it is 
recognized by China that the international uniformity is a 
natural requirement for international maritime law.=®
A L.10VCA*** 1 eSHlpfslno CS'ti mti 1
p»p3 9 30 .
22 ZHMriQ V **CSHlpplriQ L.«kw «imcl F*r*«ic= t: 1 c=«i 1 r?
TlaI Ana* Mmr- 1 -t 1 L_«iw OLJ.r-n1 • Vol • 1 A , 1 790 • p 237.
88
Being a council member of IMO, China has been actively 
participating all IMO occasions, from Assembly, Council 
sessions, to Committee, subcommittee and working group 
sessions. In the meantime, China ratifies or accedes to many 
international conventions. China is now party to 7^ IMO 
conventions, among which ^ are concerned with oil pollution 
by ships.
4.3.6.2 Ratification Procedure
The Dept, of Foreign Affairs (DOFA) under the Ministry of 
Communications is the coordinating agency in China. Convention 
ratification is channeled through it.
Before any decision is made on whether to join a convention or 
not, DOFA circulates the text of the convention with 
explanation on its developments to all organisations concerned 
in China. Feedback is passed back to DOFA. Then, a feasibility 
study meeting, including technical and legal experts, will be 
held. If it is felt desirable to participate in the 
convention, a repor"^ with detailed proposals will be drafted 
and sent to the Minister for approval. Then the proposal will 
be further circulated to other ministries concerned for their 
comments.
In the next phase, it will be presented to the State Council. 
Normally the consent of the State Council is the final stage 
in the ratification process in China. And an instrument of 
ratification signed by the Foreign Minister or upon delegation 
by the Communications Minister will be communicated to the IMO 
S-G, usually through the Chinese representative in London.
However, if the convention is deemed very important, such as 
the organization convention of a UN agency, it has to go
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through the Standing Committee o-f the NPC for examination and 
approval.
4.3.6.3 Implementation Practice
Preparation for the implementation of the convention begins 
the same time when the ratification issue is put on the 
agenda.
A. In most cases, a notice bearing the title of MOC or the 
designated departments, such as Harbor Superintendency 
administration, DOFA and Dept, of Transport Administration, is 
circulated to all relevant units in the country before the 
convention enters into force for China, the notice contains no 
material provisions but requiring all parties concerned fully 
in compliance with the convention.
B. In less frequent case, in addition to the above-mentioned 
notice, a national law or ministerial regulation is 
promulgated to bring the essence of the convention into 
operation when MOC deems it necessary. For example. Art. 28 of 
the Marine Environmental Protection Law (MEPL) provides that 
"Any oil tanker of 150 tons gross tonnage and above or any 
other vessel of 400 tons gross tonnage and above shall carry 
on board an Oil Record Book". This is borrowed from Reg. 20 of 
Marpol 73/78.
The Regulations Concerning the Prevention of Pollution of Sea 
Areas by Vessels, by applying Art. 13, requires that "vessels 
engaged in international trade with a bulk oil carrying of 
2,000 tons shall, besides observing those regulations, be 
bound by the provision of the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969."
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In both cases, there will be detailed directives. They give 
interpretation to the laws and conventions. However, -formation 
of such a practice towards international conventions in China, 
is still in a primary stage, since legislation in various 
realms are urged to be done. The workload will be too heavy 
and thus it is impossible if each convention is to have its 
equivalent law in China. Drafting a new law takes too long 
time. And there is a language problem, translation from 
English to Chinese in written form would take months time. It 
is equally difficult to translate national law into English 
version which exactly reflect the original meaning. Taken MEPL 
for instance, 8 years after its passage, what is available is 
just an "unofficial translation"!
4.4 Organizations Concerned with Vessel—Oriented Oil 
Pol 1ution
4.4.1 Delegation by Law
Art. 5 of the MEPL stipulates that:
i
"The environmental protection department under the State 
Council is in charge of marine environmental protection 
in the whole country.
The state administrative department of marine affairs is 
responsible for organizing investigations, monitoring and 
surveillance of the marine environment and for conduction 
scientific research therein, and it is in charge of 
environmental protection against marine pollution damage 
caused by offshore oil exploration and exploitation and 
by the dumping of wastes into the sea.
The Harbor Superintendency Administration of the People’s
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Republic of China is responsible for overseeing, 
investigating and dealing with the discharge of 
pollutants from vessels and for keeping under 
surveillance the waters of'the port areas, and it is in 
charge of environmental protection against pollution 
damage caused by vessels.
The state agency in charge of fishery administration and 
fishing and fishing harbor superintendence is responsible 
for supervising the discharge of wastes by vessels,in the 
fishing harbors and for keeping under surveillance the 
waters thereof.
The environmental protection department of the armed 
forces is responsible for supervising the discharge of 
wastes by naval vessels and keeping under surveillance 
the waters of the naval ports.
The environmental protection departments of the coastal 
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities 
directly under>±he Central Government are responsible for 
organising, coordinating, overseeing and checking marine 
environmental protection in their respective 
administrative areas, and are in charge of environmental 
protection against pollution damage caused by coastal 
construction projects and land-based pollutants."
This clearly shows that the Ministry of Urban and Rural 
Construction and Environment is the overal1 national authority 
in charge of marine environment protection. While HSA under 
the Ministry of Communications is responsible for commercial 
port pollution and pollution from ships.
4.4.2 Major Relevant Organizations and their Functions
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1. HSA
HSA exercises authority over, among other things, vessel- 
oriented pollution and maritime tra-f-fic safety.^ It 
stipulates detailed rules concerning the pollution control in 
waters under Chinese jurisdiction, coordinates clean-up 
operation, investigates the casualty and punishes the 
violators.
HSA has a well-established network over China. With its 
headquarters in Beijing, it has 5 bureaus in Dalian, Tianjin, 
Qingdao, Shanghai and Guangzhou, each in charge o-f several 
sub-bureaus and many stations along the coast. There are also 
local HSAs in most o-f the provinces, autonomous regions and 
direct municipalities. Thus in -fact there are HSA o-ffices in 
every Chinese port, whether sea or river port.=®
With a large team o-f quali-fied surveyors and ant i-pol 1 ut i on 
resources, HSA has been actively and e-f-fectively working on 
the prevention o-f marine pollution.
2. ZC (China ClassifAcation Society)
ZC conducts, i. a., mandatory and classification surveys, 
surveys for notarial matters in case of pollution incident, 
type approves anti-pol1ution equipments etc. Technical 
provisions of international conventions ratified by China are 
incorporated into ZC rules and regulations.
3. Dept, of Foreign Affairs (DOFA)
Among the other things, DOFA organizes delegations to IMO, 
UNCTAD and other organizations, coordinates the study and
SB . 8.K* 1 1 «»t: avd mom«p ASJ m«ij or* M8 Aai in
*'Comt3«R*bl ri9 Oil ^ollci'tLlon 1 r% Chiin«i*'. l«S^e^ Oil Spill Con*^ •r'amei*. 
Tm>^ mm , USA. p 19S.
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ratification of international conventions, and supervises 
convention enforcement in China.
4. Research Institute of Water Transport (RIWT)
RIWT is a major research institute under MOC. It carries out 
research, i. a., on national oil pollution contingency plan 
and oil compensation fund in China. It also has expertise and 
equipment on oil spill identification, the result of which may 
be used as evidence on court.
5. State Oceanic Administration (SOA)
SOA conducts, i. a., scientific research of the marine 
environment, monitors oil pollution within Chinese coastal 
waters. Since it is provided with aircrafts and remote sensing 
equipments, SOA also helps in monitoring ship—oriented 
pollution. There is a research center under SOA, which offers 
full range of oil identifying service.
6. Maritime Courts
Art. 45 of Maritime Traffic Safety Law provides that "should 
the parties concerned reject the penalties as determined by 
the competent authorities such as imposition of fine or 
withdrawal of certificate of competency, they may bring an 
action in the People’s Court ..... "
Usually it is a maritime court that the suit is lodged with. 
There are presently 5 coastal maritime courts: Dalian,
Tianjin, Qingdao, Shanghai and Guangshou.
7. China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC)
Another way to solve civil disputes is through the 
arbitration. CMAC is the sole organization entrusted with the 
responsibility for arbitration. CMAC was established on 21 
Nov. 1958 and in 1988 it was changed to the current name.
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5 CHAPTER V TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL SOLUTION FOR CHINA! 
JOINING FUND
5,1 The Impor-Lance o-f the Issue
China has a vast coastal 2one area which is fragile to marine 
pollution. It is cal cul ated that the coastal zone represents 
5'/. of the total area of China, while the population there is 
17'/. of the whole nation. This populated area also is dense 
with key industries, having more than 40,000 factories, of 
which many are vulnerable once pollution occurs.
5.1.1 Fishery and Aquaculture
Along the Chinese coastline, there is fish farming and 
aquaculture almost everywhere. The largest fishing base, 
Zhoushan, is near Shanghai.
According to FAO statisticsfish catch by China in 1987 
reached 9.3 million tons, 10'/. of the world’s total. China’s 
aquaculture is even more dominating in the world. In 1985, it 
produced 5.2 million tons, 48*/. of the world’s total .■=‘ It is 
clear that if oil spills around the coastline, substantial 
loss in fishing industry would result.
In the Feoso Ambassador case, the claim for oil pollution 
damage to aquatic products and fishing amounted to RMB 17.3 
million, representing 61^ of the total claim. (See Table lo)
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Table 13
Compensation o-f Feoso Ambassador Claim
Item RMB 7.
Aquatic 17,263,607.50 61
Cleanup 7,122,696.02 25
Shipyard 269,739.00 1
Fishing 60,000.00
Army 926,014.00
Monitoring cost 330,052.64 1
Tourism 1,936,171.80 7
Administration 432,813.40 OX.
Total 28,341,094.36 100
Sources:
Claim Against Oi1 - Pol1ution Damages to Aquatic 
Products Caused by M/T Feoso Ambassador. Fisheries 
E-iureau of Qingdao, China, 1984. pp 1-5.
Claim for Cost on Clean-up of Oil Pollution Caused by 
Feoso Ambassador. Environmental Protection Bureau of 
Qingdao, 1984. p 1.
5.1.2 Tourism & Related Services
With the open-door policy adopted in China more than 10 years 
ago, more and more foreign visitors have come to visit China. 
In 1984, PRC received 12.85 million tourists from 162 
countries and regions, a 35.67. increase on the previous 
year.*- Foreign visitors reached a peak of 4.3 million in 
1988. Income from tourism and related services such as 
hoteliers and restaurants is significant for the national 
income, especially for foreign currency earnings. From 1978 to 
1987, foreign currency generated by the tourism industry 
amounted to US$ 11 billion. In 1988 alone, US$ 2.2 billion was 
brought by tourism. China's foreign income in this area ranked
X es . BwlJlrtQt P*iub> 1 i 1 mg Mcautmw ,
X98S5. p 47^.
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20 in the world compared with 41 in 1978. These earnings 
account -for 33.67. o-f the national intangible -foreign income.
Along the coast, there are many cities open to international 
tourism. As in 84, there were about 60 open cities open.* All 
are popular places -for foreigners as well for domestic 
travellers.
Pollution is one of the major enemies of tourism. Once oil 
pollution occurs, it may soon leads to damage to nearby.scenic 
places and will affect the tourist industry in the long term. 
In 1984, the spilled oil from Feoso ambassador contaminated 
No.l , No.2, No.3, No.6 bathing t)eaches, Zhanqiao Park, Luxun 
Park, Badaguan Beach and Old Man Stone Beach etc, causing 
extensive damage to these places.® After learning of the 
incident, a great number of tourists, both foreign and 
domestic, postponed or canceled their trips to Qingdao, 
resulting in 507. loss of expected income. The claim for this 
reached RMB 1.9 million, 77. of the total claim. Table 13 shows 
that the loss of or damage to tourism was the third largest 
i tern.
5.1.3 Military Facilities
Oil spills may also bring much damage to naval bases and other 
military facilities. Let’s again take the Feoso Ambassador for 
example, the Tuandao Army Unit, situated in a heavily polluted 
area, which was severely affected by the spill resulting in 
0.9 million RMB loss and damage, 37. of the total.’
1 Xfe»lcd. pp
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From the military point of view, it is not just a matter of 
loss of money, but the availability of military operations.
5.1.4 Inhabitants and other Industries
Oil pollution will also affect the local inhabitants, 
shipyards, factories etc to a great extent.
5.1.5 Urgency-
Elimination, or rather, prevention of pollution, is certainly 
ideal. However, as analysed in 1.2.1, damage to the 
environment could not be wiped out. Adequate compensation for 
the suffered is important and urgent.
Figure 10 shows that only 88 out of 386 were compensated while 
the remaining 777. were not compensated at all. Table 11 
illustrates that 5 out of 12 big spills, representing 427., 
were not compensated. Damage of RMB 7 million, then about US$ 
3.5, could be roughly figured out.
t
The risk of oil pollution is high. Table 8 shows a total of 
386 cases from 1976 to 1986, averaging 35 spills per year. 
Among these 386, 12 were spills of more than 100 tons of oil, 
with a mean of once a year.
With the fast development of the domestic oil industry, busy 
oil transportation, and increasing tankers passing by to Japan 
and the Korean Peninsula,' the risk for significant spills will 
be higher.
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Lack of compensation or inadequate compensation not only has 
led to material loss and spiritual sufferings by the victims, 
but also impedes the effective combat of oil pollution, which 
is contrary to the environmental protection policy.
To participate in a wider compensation coverage is essential 
and imminent.
5-2 Feasibility
5.2.1 Consideration of CRISTAL
Although oil companies are so widely defined as to include 
"any public body" that is "engaged in the production, 
refining, marketing, storing, trading or terminating of oil" 
or "receives oil in bulk for its own consumption or use",^ 
there are no parties from PR China and USSR.=° The following 
points account for this:
1. These state owned oil companies are unaware or 
unwilling to join the contract;
2. No pressure or administrative organs to urge their 
participation;
3. Only about of the Chinese tanker fleet is party
to TOVALOP, while the remaining are mainly for domestic 
transport and will be unlikely to enter TOVALOP in the 
future. In this case, even if the oil companies joined 
CRISTAL, CRISTAL would still not be applicable for spills
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• involving non-TDVALOP tankers, or for spills the damage 
of which does not e>:ceed the TOVALOP Supplement limit. 
Thus the objective to protect the victims would not 
materialize;
4. This voluntary agreement will expire in 1992;
5. Disputes under CRISTAL will have to be settled in the 
UK, not the place where pollution occurs, which is 
inconvenient for the claimants.
Therefore, CRISTAL is not the ideal one for China, whils a 
statutory convention, participated through the channel of a 
sovereign state, is preferred.
5.2.2 Consideration of FUND 84
FUND 84 provides a flat oil pollution -1iabi1ity of 200 million 
SDRs, wide enough to cover all the present spills in the world 
except the Exxon Valdez, probably.
But FUND 84 has not entered into force and whether it will or 
not has to be waited for, so it doesn’t help present 
compensation even if China joins it.
There are also other factors that should be considered. The 
biggest spill up to now in China has been the Feoso 
Ambassador, which spilled off Qingdao, the most beautiful 
coastal city and probably the most expensive area in China.
The amount of compensation was RMB 17.75 million, roughly SDR 
7.3 million at that time. This is only 167. of the FUND 71 
basic limit. Damage that exceeds SDR 45 M, the FUND 71 limit, 
in China is not likely to occur in 10 years time, taking into 
account the low living standard there.
For practical purposes, FUND 71 is presently adequate for
lOl
China. However, the process o-f FUND 84 must be closely watched 
since it FUND 84 enters into force, several major FUND 71 
contributors will denounce FUND 71. Thus, even if FUND 71 is 
not to terminate at once, the contribution share from the 
remaining party will rise sharply. FUND 71 may be 
incapacitated to compensate in case of disaster among the 
remaining countries. That will be the time when China has to 
decide whether to denounce FUND 71 if it is a party, or to 
join FUND 84, or to join CLC 84, or- just to rely on municipal 
law.
5.2.3 Joining FUND 71
As seen above, FUND 71 is the existing regime which would 
cover the worst spill in China. By joining FUND 71, spills in 
China which exceed the CLC limit will be immediately covered 
by it. FUND 71 has advantages over other regimes in the case 
of China:
1. By entering into a statutory convention, shipping, as 
well as the oil cargo sector are obliged to contribute to 
oil pollution damage, which better reflects the burden 
sharing principle;
2. FUND 71 protects the whole country while CRISTAL only 
protects private interests;
3. FUND 71 also indemnifies the shipowner, which is a 
relief for the downward shipping business;
4. ICF'CF 71 has a reputation of fast compensation. It 
takes only one or two years to settle almost all the 
claims. Even in the slowest case of Tanio, lOF'CF still 
managed to work it out in 4 years time;^
5. Its 45 M SDR is adequate for spills in Chinese waters,
1 1 w V op p ZOO*
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while FUND 84 limit is too high;
6. Disputes under FUND 71 are settled in municipal court;
7. More participation at the international stage.
5-3 Cos-t Bene-fit Analysis
5.3.1 Cost
As required by FUND 71, any person who receives more than 
150,000 metric tons of contributing oil in a contracting state 
in the relevant calendar year must contribute to lOPCF 71.
Such contributions are divided into annual and initial 
contributions.
5.3.1.1 Annual Contributions
Annual contributions are levied to meet the anticipated 
payments of compensation and indemnification by the lOPCF and 
the administrative expenses of the FUND during the coming 
year.
t
Annual contributions are further divided into the General Fund 
and Major Claims Fund. They are so calculated;
GFn = TGFr, COn-l / TCOn—1
MCF,., = TMCF„ * COm-i / TC0r,-i
where; GFr, means General Fund levied on one 
contributor in n year;
TGFm means Total Fund levied on all 
contributors in n year;
C0r,-i means Contributing Oil by one contributor 
in n-1 year;
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TCOm-1 means Total Contributing Oil by all 
contributors in n-1 year;
MCFm means Major Claims Fund levied on one 
contributor in m year;
MCF„ means Total Major Claims Fund levied on 
all contributors in m year;
M > n.
TBFr, / TCDm-i and TMCFr, / TCOrn-i is given each year by the 
annual Assembly.
In 1986, the contributing oil calculated according to FUND 71 
in China was 19.4 million tons, among which 17.86 M tons was 
crude oi 1 . In their calculation, RIWT included 61,800 tons 
of lubricating oil as contributing oil, which I think the 
contrary. Contributing oil, for easy of administration, just 
includes crude oil or heavy fuel oil,® while for compensation 
FUND 71 covers all persistent oil incidents. Lubricating oil 
is not a kind of fuel oil. Nevertheless, as 61,800 tons of 
lubricating is only 0.37. of the total oil, figures given by 
RIWT are still good for use in having a draft picture of 
China’s contributing* oi 1 .
Table 14 shows China’s contribution position in FUND 71. If 
China joins FUND 71, it will pay about £90,000 every year. 
Since total levy changes each year, with an increasing 
tendency during the last several years, there may be a slight 
increase for China’s contribution per year.
Table 15 indicates the present contribution shares for member 
countries in the calendar year of 1988. If China is to join, 
it will be ranked 10th, just after the USSR, with a share of
1 «IWX, esp Pit. pp ap—30 .
SS r>wf 1 n ±-ti 1. can In Ai-t . 3 <X> o-P PUMD "71 .
104
2.287.
5.3.1.2 Initial Contribution
Initial contributions are payable when a state becomes a 
member o-f the IDPCF 71 on the basis o-f a -fixed amount per ton 
of contributing oil received the year preceding that in which 
the FUND Convention enters into -force tor that state. This 
amount was tixed by the Assembly at 0.04718 trancs per ton 
<0.003145 SDR, which at 29 Dec. 1989 corresponded to 
£0.002640) . =1
A tormula could be used to describe the calculation;
IC„ = C0r,-x * 0.04718 (trancs) 
where; IC„ means Initial Contributions trom one state 
when FUND 71 becomes ettective tor it in n 
year.
So, the initial contribution tor China at present is estimated 
as :
20,000,000 * 0.04718 = 943600 Fs = £51280
5.3.1.3 Total Contribution
China would have contributed;
999857 + 51280 = £1,051,137 
over 1979 - 1989, or £95,558 per year on an average.
± XOP’CF' Wwpor-'t « p
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Table 14
Contributing Oil in China and the Levy
Year lOPC Oil 
’OOOtons
Total Levy 
£' 000
China Oil 
’OOOtons
China Levy 
£
1979 887000 750 16580 14019
1980 947740 10000 17160 181062
1981 878740 500 16370 9314
1982 833730 860 16600 17123
1983 838180 24106 16730 481153
1984 792440 0 16690 34251
1985 819380 1500 18710 0
1986 770560 1800 19400 45318
1987 787867 1200 20000* 30462
1988 795254 2990 20000* 75196
1989 857458 4800 20000* 111959
Total 9208349 48506 198240 999857
Average/t £0.0052676 £0.0050437
Average/year 4410 90896
Source: RIWT, op cit. Table 10.
lOPC Annual Report 88, 89.
* Supposed -figures.
Note; This is only a rough picture showing the 
relationship between total levy and contributing oil. For 
accurate calculations, consult lOPCF Secretariat.
r
Table 15
Contributing Oil Received in the Territories o-f 
Member States in the Calendar Year 1988 
As reported at 1989.12.31
Member State Contribution Oil (tons) V.
Japan 229,867,256 26.80
Italy 21,928,308 14.22
France 98,918,228 11.54
Netherlands 85,891,659 10.02
UK 78,431,051 9.15
Spai n 52,835,150 6.16
Canada 30,173,643 3.52
FRG 23,907,309 2.79
USSR 20,175,600 2.35
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China^ 20,000,000# 2.28*
Greece 17,135,850 2.00
Sweden 16,367,118 1.91
Norway 15,088,913 1.76
Finland 11,641,300 1.36
Portugal 10,520,555 1.23
Yugoslavia 8,740,778 1.02
Indonesia 8,697,786 1.01
Denmark 8,599,532 1.00
Bahamas 5,658,586 0.66
Cote d’Ivoire 3,104,141 0.36
Tunisia 2,913,701 0.34
Sri Lanka 1,848,063 0.22
Cameroon 1,487,396 0.17
Pol and 1,454,526 0.16-
Ghana 836,638 0.10
Syrian Arab Rep 477,084 0.06
A1 ger i a 499,000 0.06
Papua New Guinea jL. V ^ 0.03
Fiji 0 0
Iceland 0 0
Kuwait 0 0
Liberia 0 0
Mai dives 0 0
Monaco 0 0
□man 0 0
Seychel1es 0 0
Tuvalu 0 0
Beni nit:#
Cyprus## -
Gabon##
Nigeria##
Qatar##
UAE##
Vanuatu##
857,458,424 100.00
* If China joins 
No report
Source: lOPCF Annual Report, 1989. Annex VI.
5.3.2 State Responsibility
5.3.1 shows the responsibility for China’s industry in 
pecuniary terms. Although contracting states bear no financial
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responsibility and FUND 71 purposely put little 
responsibility, i-f at all, on the states in order to 
facilitate their participation, it is necessary to examine the 
major role a state undertakes after its accession.
First, the state should establish, relevant laws or regulations 
to put FUND 71 into force;
Second, each year the contracting state shall communicate to 
the Director of lOPCF the name and address of any person 
liable to contribute as wel1'as the amount of contribution oil 
they receive;^
Third, a state may choose to assume the obligation to 
contribute in respect of any person. In so doing, the state 
shall declare in writing and specify which obligations are 
assumed;^
Fourth, the contracting state shall ensure that its 
contribution fulfill their obligations to contribute under 
FUND 71;
Fifth, each contraction state shall ensure that its courts 
possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain any actions 
against the IDPCF thereunder, so the state shall have 
competent professionals on FUND 71;
Theses are mainly administrative matters, and since China has 
been a CLC party for 10 years, there is not much problem for 
the Chinese government to fulfil its obligations. The 
contribution to lOPCF will almost surely be channelled through
1 fti-t . lO* ‘T’l ■
Ar-t . lA- *7* X .
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the administration.
What is left to do is perhaps to per-fect its liability and 
compensation regulations and to establish an appropriate 
management.
5.3.3 Benefits
In the Feoso Ambassador case, as Panama, ship’s -flag state, 
and China are both CLC parties, shipowner liability was. 
limited to CLC 69 limit. Feoso Ambassador’s limitation ton = 
15,572.26 net ton + 7,674.04 engine room = 23,246.3 tons.
Its limitation = 133 SDR * 23,246.3 = SDR 3,091,757.9 = US$ 
3,201,577.14 = RMB 6,453,433.
A RMB 28.3 M claim was lodged and finally RMB 17.75 was agreed 
upon. Since the tanker owner was a party to TOVALOP and oil 
cargo was owned by the Philippine National Oil Co., a Cristal 
member, the exceeding part, RMB 11,296,567 (£3.5 M) was paid 
by CRISTAL Ltd.
Since TDVALOP and CRISTAL are tanker and cargo oriented 
regimes, they do not guarantee 1007. compensation for spills 
in a certain area. TOVALOP and CRISTAl have a member coverage 
of 98% and 80% respectively, so, theoretical 1y there is a 98%
5^ 80% = 22% possibility for tanker pollution which is not 
covered by CRISTAL.
But in China, the national fleet of 192 tankers with 2.7 M 
tons dwt dominates oil transport, and when oil is transferred 
domestically, no oil cargo is owned by a CRISTAL owner. The 4 
significant spills unpaid out of the total of 10 from 1976 - 
1986 were not covered by CRISTAL in any way. To protect the 
integrity of the marine environment, an area-oriented regime
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is pre-ferred.
As 5.3.1 indicated, had China joined FUND 71, an exposure of 
£3.5 !i and 4 suspending large spills would have been covered 
by paying only £1 million, and by contributing £95,558 per 
year <see 5.3.1.3) from now on, the potential risk of 
pollution will be covered.
FUND also relieves part of the shipowner's liability, 
constituting 257. of the total liability.
Other benefits;
1. International participation shows the willingness of 
PRC towards universal solutions through international 
cooperation;
2. Joining FUND will accelerate the relevant legislation 
in China;
3. Encouraging both victims and the polluter to take an 
active part against the oil spill;
4. To restore and protect the environment;
5. To safeguard the loss of fishing, aquaculture, 
tourism, hoteliers and restaurants etc;
6. To safeguard the attraction of foreign investment in 
coastal areas;
7. To expedite the compensation process and save legal 
expenses; and
8. To raise the image of the shipping and oil industries.
5.4 Proposed Matnagefnenl:
To facilitate compensation in China after joining FUND 71, 
there needs to be set up an administrative body. A Council 
comprising members from the following is preferred:
no
Ministry o-f Communications;
Ministry o-f Urban S< Rural Construction Environment 
Ministry of Agriculture;
Ministry of Energy.
Ill
a
6 Ch VI Conclusion
The increasing tendency o-f marine pollution is threatening 
modern society. It is realised that the protection of marine 
environment has to be sought at a global level, and the global 
pollution liability regimes, CLC, FUND, TOVALOP and CRISTAL, 
have been actively working on liability and compensation 
issues.
TOVALOP and CRISTAL are voluntary and temporary in nature, 
while CLC and FUND are statutory. To safeguard a country’s 
interests, it is advisable to join statutory conventions, and 
these conventions are the only way towards a universal 
solution.
The fate of the CLC 84, FUND 84, depends greatly on the US 
attitude. Although there are lots of advantages for the US, 
joining or not is still under debate in Congress. If the US is 
to ratify them, CLC 84 and FUND 84 may come into force around 
1994. Even if the US refuses to join, the tendency towards a 
universal solution is definite and some new conventions, more 
suitable to all the countries in the world, will have to be 
drafted.
For China at present, it is proposed to ratify FUND 71, which 
will be enough to cover all China’s current claims.
By joining FUND 71, China has to contribute roughly £95,558 
per year on an average term. It then of benefit in covering 
the risk of a case like Feoso Ambassador, which had a claim of 
£3.5 million. FUND is of further advantage for China in 
accelerating the development of its relevant legislation; by 
better encouraging victims and polluters to combat spills;
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sa-feguarding -fishing, aquaculture and tourism; quickening the 
compensation process; saving legal expenses and raising its 
international reputation.
To join FUND 71, China also needs to per-Fect its present laws 
and regulations, aiming at -filling in the gap le-ft by CLC 69 
and FUND 71.
To administer FUND matters in China, it is advisable to 
establish a Council of Oil Pollution Fund in China, which will 
be composed of members from relevant ministries and oil and 
shipping companies. The Secretariat to the Council will handle 
day to day matters arising thereunder.
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ANNEX I
STATUS o-f CLC,FUND LLMC BY COUNTRY
90.01.31
CLC FUND LLMC
COUNTRY ------- P
69 ------- f76 i84 84* 171 76 84 84*
Algeria t\ X
Australia X X X
Bahamas !•; X X X
Belgium X X
Benin X X
Br az i 1 X
Cameroon X X
Canada X !•'
Chile X
China X % » t\ )•»
Cote d'Ivoire X
Cyprus X X X
Denmark X X /■* X /% X
Dominican Rep. X
Ecuador X
Egypt X X
Fiji X J.J
Finland l\ X '*%
France X X X !•! X V X
Gabon /■C X
GDR X
FRG X X t'\ X X
Ghana X V/f\
Greece X X X
Guatemala J.J
Iceland X
India X X
Indonesia /•t X
It al y X X A 1
Japan X X X
Kuwait X X X
Lebanon
Liberia
Maldives X
Monaco V X
Morocco t'\ X
Netherlands X X y*
New Zealand X
Nigeria
Norway V X X X
□man X \ t t\ X
Panama X
Papua New Guinea X X
Peru X V\
Poland t‘\ ^ 1 \*A 1 r' __ X
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(Continued)
COUNTRY
CLC FUND LLMC
69 76 84 84* 71 76 84 84*
Portugal X X X
Qatar X X X
Rep. of Korea % /St. Vincent \f
the Grenadines X
Senegal >X
Seychel 1 es X
Singapore X X
South Africa X X
Spai n X /‘v X J.# XSri Lanka X
Sweden X \r X X V' XSwitzerland X V
Syrian Arab Rep. *x X
Tunisi a X
Tuvalu X X
USSR X X X X
UAE X X
UK X X X X X X
USA X V
Vanuatu X X X X
Yemen X
Yugoslavia /‘v X
Total 66 34 6 13 43 17 .Aiw 12 16
■/ World Tonnage or> o ^ 58 2.8 57.9 42.1 1.8 37.4
* Signatories.
Date at 1989.1.1-.
Sources; 1. MEPC 29/2. Feb. 8, 1990. IMO.
2. Status o-f Multilateral Conventions S< Instruments 
in respect o-f which the IMO or its Secretary—General 
performs depository or other functions, as at 1988.12.31. 
IMO. p 308.
3. Shipping Statistics Yearbook 1989. Bremen: ISL. pp
11-14.
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Annex II
Statue o-f CLC,FUND LLMC
90.01.31
CLC FUND
LLMC*Nufnbsr s
69 76 84 71 76 84
Entry into force 750619 810408 - 781016 - - 861201
Si gnitories 28 4 13 17 12 8
Contracting party 66 34 6 43 17 OX. 16
IMO member 64 34 5 42 17 2
other o 1 1 — —
Entrance requirem - - 10 - - 8
Non-party IMO 
member 70 100 129 92 117 132
Source; MEPC 29/2, February 8, 1990. IMO.
)(c Status o-f multilateral conventions S< instruments in 
respect of which the IMO or its Secretary-General 
performs depositary or other functions, as at 1988.12.31.
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